

Low Intensity Conflict: A War By Any Other Name

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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: A WAR BY ANY OTHER NAME

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. Introduction	
Philosophy and Theory of Conflict	1
Problem	2
2. Low Intensity Conflict in General	
Defining Low Intensity Conflict	6
The Conflict Spectrum and Characteristics of LIC	11
Conclusion	15
3. The Significance of Low Intensity Conflict	
An Example	17
Recent Military Focus and Development	20
Western Vulnerability	28
Future Conflict	37
4. An Overview of the Main Types of LIC	
Insurgency	44
Counter-Insurgency	60
5. An Overview of other LIC	
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power	77
Foreign Internal Defence	79
Terrorism and Terrorism Counter-action	80
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking	84
Peace-Time Contingencies	90
6. Guiding Strategy and Tactics	
National Philosophy	92
National Security Strategy	96
Military Doctrine	98

7.	A Force That Caters for LIC	
	National and Strategic	102
	Tactical	108
8.	Preparation and Training for Conflict	
	Higher Command	112
	Operational Art	114
	Tactical	116
	Individual	120
9.	Conclusion	126
	Endnotes	128
	Bibliography	138
	Appendices	
	A. Definitions	
	B. Conflict Spectrum	

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF CONFLICT

The following postulates, whether judged as empirical, hypothetical, true or false, are a relevant starting point for the examination of conflict.

- * Harmony and disharmony are natural, inevitable, and evolutionary characteristics of mankind.
- * Disharmony is resolved by peaceful or violent means, as reflected by a spectrum of conditions from peaceful competition to violent conflict.
- * The peaceful resolution of conflict is preferable and common, but yet to preclude the option of violence: models of intra-national and spiritual harmony are neither analagous to, nor bind, international relations at this point in time.
- * Conflict and its resolution is multidimensional, multi-level, and integrated.
- * States, sub-national groups and trans-national groups may come into conflict with each other and prosecute this conflict with violence. Whatever the origins of the conflict it is played out in the environment of the "state system": often in an attempt to alter the status quo of that system.
- * Force may be employed by individuals in an anarchical or irrational manner, but it is used by the state and the interest group in the pursuit of objectives.

- * The use of force is limited by capacity, risk and objectives.
- * At a minimum, a state will seek a capacity of force commensurate with the threat to its survival, once security is achieved a state will seek the ability to pursue interests.
- * The status quo of the state, if not its survival, can be threatened within all levels of conflict, but the most decisive effect is achieved by unlimited force.
- * The state's ability to project violence is institutionalized in armed forces, i.e., armies, navies, and air forces.

PROBLEM

The objective of armed forces is to win wars: trite but true. Armed forces may posture and project power by inference if able to project violence by action. Military victory in war is the reason d'etre for an army. This rationale may be over-ridden by higher strategy, but a non-combatant or incompetant army defies definition and justification in the West. (1)

The role of the armed forces is supportive of the state in the pursuit of national interests. Regardless of the level of a conflict, military action must be integrated with action in the political, social, economic, and psychological dimensions of a problem. The military dimension is

predominate in the higher levels of conflict. Hitherto, the West has considered the higher levels of conflict the predominate threat, despite a continuing need to operate in lower levels of conflict. (2) The rationale for this focus was substantial, but now the concept is dated.

Success in present and future conflicts requires the ability for integrated action in all dimensions and at all levels in proportion to the threat or interest. This concept is well expressed by the authors of "Integrated Strategy and Discriminate Deterrence":

Because our problems in the real world are connected and because budgets compel trade-offs, we need to fit together strategies for a wide range of conflicts: from the most confined, lowest intensity and highest probability to the most widespread, apocalyptic and least likely. We want the worst conflicts to be less likely, but that holds only if our weakness at some higher level... does not invite such raising of the ante. For genuine stability, we need to assure our adversaries that military aggression at any level of violence against our important interests will be opposed by military force. (3)

The logic of "Integrated Strategy and Discriminate Deterrence" (4) is relevant to all Western nations, irrespective of size. Even in a relatively benign strategic environment such as Australia enjoys currently, defence preparedness must address the maintenance of capabilities applicable to other levels of conflict than the near term threat. (5)

Within the combat environment of the future (6) the objective of armed forces remains to win wars, regardless of type or complexity. The question remains, "How?". There are

two extreme solutions: with unlimited resources a nation may structure, equip, and train forces for each type and region of conflict; or, with limited resources, have one force attempt to do everything. The reality is a compromise tailored to each nation's situation. Perhaps with the exception of the United States, there are few Western nations that can afford the maintenance of large "specialized modules" within an army. Even the United States is limited in this regard by the number and variety of contingencies it must face; For example, the US Marine Corps, must retain a diversity of war-fighting skills for employment world-wide. These tasks range from the amphibious assault by conventional forces to hostage rescue in a foreign country. (7) An example of the flexible use of armed forces has been illustrated by the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The same units of this force have operated proficiently in counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland, in mechanized operations with the British Army on the Rhine, and fought in the Falklands War.

For reasons that will be examined later, most Western states already possess significant professional armies for fighting in the higher levels of conflict. However, the recent wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Latin America, and modern terrorism, illustrates that such conventional armies may not win easily in lower levels of conflict. Even if a conventional army is not defeated in such a conflict, it is likely to be debilitated.

The armed forces and the interests of the West have been debilitated in the past by Low Intensity Conflict. For this reason, and others discussed in Chapter Three, the West is to continue to be engaged in Low Intensity Conflict. It is the most likely combat environment in the near future. Western democratic states possess inherent vulnerabilities in this environment which are likely to make LIC an increasingly attractive option for those unable to "win" by other means, peaceful or violent.

The problem for a Western democratic nation is to maintain and employ an appropriate strategy, force and tactics for the conduct of Low Intensity Conflict while meeting the other requirements of national strategy and without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a higher level of war.

CHAPTER TWO

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN GENERAL

DEFINING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There is a plethora of terminology covering the subject of Low Intensity Conflict. Many of the terms are abstract and have a political and philosophical context as well as a military definition. In addition, there are both subtle and distinct differences among single service, joint service, and international terminology in this field. For the purpose of clarity, a table of comparative definitions is included as Appendix A.

Colonel Richard H. Taylor, US Army, provided a useful definition of Low Intensity Conflict in the Military Review of January 1988 when he described it as an environment in which:

Interests are contested; organized violence is used to effect or influence outcomes; all elements of national power are employed; the military dimension is employed primarily for its political, economic and informational effect; military violence is employed indirectly or limited by time and objective." (1)

It is an environment that spans a range of struggles of varying nature and intensity. Figure 1 lists these struggles by military definition. (2) These struggles, or operations, are generally considered as above the environment of "peaceful competition", but below the threshold of "war". (3)

The boundaries that differentiate LIC from peaceful competition and higher conflict are blurred. Each conflict must be analysed in detail to determine its precise nature

Figure 1

EXAMPLES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

<u>Offensive Operations</u>	<u>Defensive Operations</u>
* Insurgency	* Counter Insurgency
	* Aid-to-the-Civil Power (4)
	* Foreign Internal Defence
* Terrorism (5)	* Terrorism Counter-Action
* Peacemaking Operations	* Peacekeeping Operations
* Peacetime Contingency Operations	* Peacetime Contingency Operations

and the appropriate response. Conflict easily transitions between levels and many of the strategies found in the LIC environment concentrate on controlling the time and place of transition. This is the case for the revolutionary strategies of Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model.

The Vietnam War, for example, was played across three levels of conflict: firstly, insurgency by the Viet Cong against the South Vietnamese and their allies; secondly, guerrilla war and limited war by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army against the South Vietnamese and their allies; and, finally, general war between North and South Vietnam. (6) The transition from one level of conflict to another during the Vietnam War was indistinct, with different levels of violence conducted simultaneously in different regions or even within the same area but by different forces. (7)

A fundamental lesson in preparing for LIC is to be wary of templating a response in accordance with the academic or

political categorization of the conflict. Each conflict is unique and unlikely to fit exactly within a military definition. For example, the Multinational Force II in Beirut in 1983 was committed with an implied mission of "peacekeeping": would there have been a more appropriate tactical emphasis by the commander of US Marines in MNF II if the mission had stressed a role of Foreign Internal Defence instead of "presence"? (8) Commanders at all levels, including politicians, must remember that a classification of a conflict is of little consequence to soldiers ambushed and killed, whether by insurgents or by regular troops.

The further lesson to be derived from a comparison of the definition and reality of Low Intensity Conflict is the need to be prepared to fight above or below the initial level of violence. Not only can the transition be swift, but what constitutes Low Intensity Conflict and what is "war" is a relative perception. There are aspects of Peacetime Contingency or Peacemaking Operations that in a microcosm are war, i.e., operations that are tactically and strategically the same as those effected during a higher level of conflict. In some cases, the difference is that the LIC is regionally confined. If an environment of LIC has been established then it normally requires more than police work. In order to be successful in this environment armed forces may act as a police force but they must be trained as if for war. An army is capable of carrying out police work, but a police force cannot be effective beyond the domestic state of peaceful competition unless it becomes an army.

By the current definitions Low Intensity Conflict is not

war. However, many aspects of these types of conflict are analogous to war and the conflict itself may be a campaign within or complementary to a war. Future warfare is likely to be less coherent, less compartmentalized, and conducted without much regard to current definitions and perceptions of what is, or what is not, war. (9) Already, there are few constitutionally declared wars. The United States and the

Soviet Union possess the ability to oppose each other directly, indirectly, or through a combination of both. These states are able to wage conflict in any combination of level, region, and time frame. The United States perception of Low Intensity Conflict, for example, places such conflict within the frame-work of contest between the Soviet Union and the West:

While the Soviets cannot be branded as instigators of all revolutionary movements, their strategy clearly is to exploit domestic vulnerabilities in foreign countries to promote the emergence of regimes under Soviet influence control. All this is accomplished under the rubric of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States and the West, defined as a continuing contest in which all forms of struggle are permissible short of all-out war. (10)

Certainly there are other causes of international conflict in the world apart from USA-USSR rivalry: there is a larger ideological rivalry of East-West; the competition between the developed and undeveloped nations; a potential challenge to other religions by Islam; and, the instability offered by various combinations of sub-national groups and states attempting to subvert the "state system". As more states, and even sub-states, gain high-technology, wealth, and international influence, the pursuit of interests by armed conflict will be less constrained by region and method. The advantage in this environment will be held by the state or group able to orchestrate efforts across a spectrum of conflicts. A Low Intensity Conflict may constitute only one "battlefield" in a larger war.

Low Intensity Conflict may not be defined as "war", but

it is best approached by politicians and the military alike with the same philosophy and determination that a higher level of violence would command. Such an approach aids in establishing the continuity of intention from the leader of the state to the soldier in the "war", and across all the dimensions of the conflict. Thinking of the conflict in terms of a "Small War" (11) does not prejudice the conduct with inappropriate tactics, but makes it easier to translate the intention into understandable and achievable objectives in the field. It should be noted that the revolutionary strategies to be found in the LIC environment aim to destroy this continuity. The first disconnection within the West is that the struggle may not be perceived as "war", that it may not command the same respect or effort as "war". The counter is found in the education of the politicians, military, and public on the nature of specific conflicts and conflict in general:

Clearly, only well informed opinions can serve our nations. This is one of the main reasons why it is necessary to develop an appropriate policy framework for open, declaratory statements that educate the people of the free world on the reality, nature, and long term impact of modern insurgency. (12)

THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The official definitions of Low Intensity Conflict describe an environment in which a number of characteristics are predominant and which must be addressed during preparation for future conflict. However, a clearer

understanding of this environment and its relationship to other levels of conflict is gained by viewing LIC in relation to the conflict spectrum. A diagram of the spectrum is at Appendix B.

From an understanding of the general nature of LIC it is possible to deduce general characteristics of the environment for which national strategy and its military component must cater. In turn, this strategy drives the preparation and conduct of the armed forces. This process must be completed before a specific conflict arises or subsequent responses are likely to be defensive and reactive, i.e., the initiative has already been lost. The strategy should be based on pre-empting LIC or utilizing it to advantage. Both these paths require, as in other forms of warfare, the seizing of initiative. This is most commonly by offensive action, but in a conflict where the military dimension is less a factor, then the military command must be attuned to seizing psychological, political, social or economic initiative with less combat force than unrestrained war. This restriction of violence must not be translated into the tactical martyrdom of troops. Nor should it be construed as at odds with the principles of war. (13) The restriction on violence should be appreciated in accordance with the principle of "economy of force". In LIC it is the application of this principle that is not always understood by soldiers or statesmen.

The general characteristics of the Low Intensity Conflict environment may be described as follows:

- * It is conducted within three theatres: intra-state, inter-state, and a combination of intra- and inter-state.
- * The intra-state level of disharmony and violence is above that resulting from routine domestic crime and the ability of the state to resolve without resort to military force, but below civil war or foreign invasion.
- * The inter-state level of disharmony and violence is above the posturing and threat of military force, and the limited and indirect military violence that is incidental to peaceful inter-state competition (14) but below war.

* A combination of intra-and inter-state disharmony and violence may be undertaken in an orchestrated manner by both states and sub-national groups. Such campaigns are normally played-out under the pervasive shadow of the East-West competition. This bi-polar competition may feed on the existing disharmony to be found in the Third World and among disgruntled sub-national groups.

However, there is a potential for other rivalries, such as the North-South competition, to be manifest by a combination of intra and inter-state conflict. This environment is increasingly open for exploitation by players other than the USSR and the USA. (15)

* Military violence alone is not the decisive factor of resolve. It is limited by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and quantity of force. (16)

* Military violence is employed in concert with

action in the political, social, economic, and psychological dimensions of the conflict. This action may be executed by military forces as well as other agencies.

* The LIC environment focuses on maintaining or changing the structure of a state and the pursuit of state interests by "extra-legal" means short of war. It also includes those groups, who are sub-national or trans-national in nature, that attempt by actions such as terrorism to change the status quo of international relations. These groups are generally ineffective unless supported, at least covertly, by a state.

* The maintenance or change of the state by means short of war is primarily the environment of insurgency and counter-insurgency. In particular, the change or overthrow of the established state from within by illegitimate means such as subversion, terrorism, and revolution. Much of this environment is the world of revolt against the status quo of society, politics, economics and the balance of power.

* The pursuit of state interests short of war is the projection of limited military power to effect limited objectives, such as Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, the protection of sea lanes from piracy, and hostage rescue.

* There will often be a dual nature to LIC operations depending on whether the environment is at home or abroad. One state may conduct counter-insurgency for survival while it is assisted by another state in the

pursuit of national interest. This difference of perception is another area of potential incoherence and disunity of effort.

* The conflict may be over a protracted period of time because of the inability to resolve it decisively by force. In fact, the conflict may never be resolved but move to a different level. If this level is within the environment of "peaceful competition" then the West is likely to consider that the democratic processes have won and are at work. Other political philosophies are likely to consider this situation a setback, but not a loss. In this environment a winning strategy is not only pre-emptive, but vigilant, protracted and evolutionary.

CONCLUSION

The following features may be concluded as appropriate to the general philosophy and strategy in preparing for, and conducting, Low Intensity Conflict. They are deduced by examination of the definition and general characteristics of Low Intensity Conflict, and the environment in which it is conducted.

* Low Intensity Conflict is analogous to war and requires the same philosophical, strategical, and tactical approach as war.

* Low Intensity Conflict can be waged in isolation or as part of war. National and military strategy must integrate the strategy to conduct Low Intensity Conflict into a strategy that addresses a spectrum of threats that may arise in a variety of combinations.

* The strategy, force structure and tactics of an army should maximize the elements common to the conduct of all conflict and cater for the differences.

* Strategy, tactics and force structure must be competent in the higher levels of conflict and adapt to fight LIC rather than visa-versa. An army must be at least capable of fighting conventional warfare.

* The West's strategy for LIC is likely to be in pursuit of national interest abroad, but its LIC strategy should also cater for threats at home

* The conduct of LIC requires a coordinated effort across the full range of political, social, economic, and military dimensions that make up a state. Military violence is not normally the decisive factor in LIC as a balance of power may be achieved by an opposing combination of other factors. However, the possession of a superior violence capability confers the major advantage in LIC and all conflict. A strategy may allow the employment of this capability in a discriminating manner, but it must never surrender this potential willingly. A strategy must at least aim to gain or hold the balance of military power.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

AN EXAMPLE

On the 23rd October 1983, a truck laden with the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the US contingent of the Multinational Force (MNF II) at Beirut International Airport, Beirut, Lebanon, penetrating the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building resulting in the deaths of 241 US military personnel. (1)

Almost simultaneously with the attack on the US Marine compound, a similar truck bomb exploded at the French MNF headquarters. (2) These attacks were executed on behalf of a revolutionary group by single "terrorists" and supported directly or indirectly by other states. (3)

The bombing was a military and political success for those groups who opposed the MNF II presence and mission in Lebanon and were unable to eject it by direct combat. The MNF II was withdrawn from Lebanon by April 1984 in the face of a seemingly impossible task and a lack of international public and political support. It had failed to aid the Lebanese Armed Forces carry out its responsibilities as directed by the force mission. (4)

The bombing was classified by the US as, "...tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terrorism." (5) No doubt the perpetrators would agree with the US that the bombing was an act of war, but would debate the label of "unlawful use of violence" (6) attached by the US definition of terrorism. Whatever the semantics of the label, the Beirut bombing is a

good example of violent conflict below the threshold of war, and which the layman does not perceive to be the legitimate face of war. This type of conflict is classified as Low Intensity Conflict. (7)

The significance of the Beirut bombing is that two nuclear superpowers suffered a tactical defeat at the hands of a much lesser force, and that the political objectives of four major powers working in concert were thwarted by the same lesser force. There are valuable lessons to be learned or relearned from the incident, and many of these have already been absorbed by the West. Ironically, the increasing threat of LIC to the USA was the subject of a report completed in June 1983 by the Defence Technical Information Center for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The report was prophetic:

Hardly a day passes without a terrorist incident occurring somewhere in the world. Although the United States has not so far been a primary target of attack, any optimism that this benign state of affairs will continue is misplaced. Used as a strategic weapon, the vectored terrorist threat offers certain unique advantages in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives... Too, the initial uncertainty about the origin of attack often limits the full range of diplomatic and military responses. For the Soviet Union and its proxies-and certain of the radical national and subnational groups on the terrorist scene-terrorism may offer an irresistibly low-cost, low-risk means of engaging the West in low-intensity conflict.... The days in which terrorism was confined to isolated instances of social disruption may well be over. Contemporary terrorism has become a tactic of strategic value whether employed by neo-nihilistic subnational groups or by nation states. (8)

The major lessons to be learnt from the Beirut bombing

by the Western states were: the utility of Low Intensity Conflict and military might does not automatically assure victory.

The latter maxim is acknowledged by the US military with the popularization of "manoeuvre warfare theory" over "attrition warfare theory", and the need to fight with brain as well as brawn: a concept that is as old as combat and long incorporated in the philosophy of armies with meagre resources and facing quantitatively superior foes. This should not denigrate the quantitative approach to warfare; for sometimes it is the most expeditious way to win a conflict. Despite the desirability of "minimal violence" espoused in current LIC doctrine, (9) the option of massive force must not be surrendered. The relative balance of force is no less a consideration in LIC than any other conflict, with the militarily weaker antagonist seeking to negate or gain superiority of force as a precondition to achieving subsequent objectives.

The philosophies of quantitative and qualitative warfare are complementary, and the reality of battle requires the co-ordinated application of both. The crux of Low Intensity Warfare is to reduce the advantage of quantitative military power in the resolution of conflict until that power or objectives are obtained. If the former is achieved before the latter, then increased options are available in the pursuit of objectives.

Soldiers, politicians and the public must understand how

to employ and defeat the various types and strategies of LIC.

(10) It requires an integrated effort no less serious than war.

RECENT MILITARY FOCUS AND DEVELOPMENT

LIC is not a new phenomena, (11) although it has recently become a popular subject. To be successful in LIC, it is necessary to understand not only the general nature of the LIC environment, but the evolution of LIC. The evolution points to not only why it is utilized but why it has been successful against the West. Understanding these aspects helps to formulate an appropriate strategy, tactics and training for LIC. The evolution of LIC also points towards some inherent vulnerabilities of the West in this environment and how to avoid them in the future.

The lessons of the Beirut reiterate those of the Vietnam War, the war in Afghanistan, the conflict in Northern Ireland, modern terrorism, and numerous revolutionary struggles of this century. However, Western democratic states have tended to focus their attention on the upper end of the conflict spectrum (12) as the greatest and most probable threat requiring military action, rather than viewing conflict as a continuum of escalation, diminution, and integration of violence levels. There have been understandable reasons for this focus and the relegation of LIC behind conventional and nuclear warfare in importance. Perceived Threat.

Firstly, nations have evolved armed forces for purposes

ranging from the projection of force by violence, to the possession of force for defence. Nationhood requires at least the ability to protect the state against the greatest perceived threat, generally defined as foreign. In most cases this threat has been seen a loss in the highest level of conflict: general war. The perceived consequences of such a loss range from apocalyptic destruction of the country, and even life on earth, to the loss of statehood and the ability to implement will. Whatever the real consequences, they are equated with national survival and too serious to gamble away with a lack of preparation based on a prediction of the future level of conflict. The, validity of this proposition is obvious in the case of the United States, whose principal threat is seen as the "global challenge posed by the Soviet Union" (13).

All states must be prepared for war, if only for survival. Not only can the bi-polar nature of global conflict enmesh a country without waring or preventive recourse, but the environment can change unpredictably to pit one country against another. The recent Falklands War is a case in point. Such a conflict was constrained to a region, but still a significant and unexpected war for the participants.

The military strategy of a nation must address high and mid level conflict as a priority. Nuclear and global war has been prevented since World War II by deterrence and the prospect of Pyrrhic victory. Deterrence is a major factor in the containment of violence and the maintenance of national

security for all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear. It is essential that, "Our military capabilities and competence must command respect." (14)

One consequence of the institutionalization of massive force in support of the established nations, has been the increased utility of Low Intensity Conflict for the "weak". Intra-and inter-state antagonists, who wish to avoid the potentially catastrophic consequences of a direct conflict, must employ strategy and tactics to remove the advantage of military power held by the enemy, i.e., turn a weakness into a strength and vice versa. Such an antagonist, whether of domestic or international origin, may seek to change the status quo by engaging the enemy state in an orchestration of attack, which not only includes low level military conflict, but political, social, economic and psychological dimensions. The strategy and tactics of LIC, and in particular revolution, have evolved in line with the evolution of conventional military power and the "state system". The strategies of LIC are well developed by those groups who do not possess the power of a state and by those who operate outside of the state system.

The current utility of LIC has been heightened by the the great number of world alliances and the bi-polar nature of global politics. The use of maximum military force against a weaker state, may be curtailed by the risk of bringing into the conflict a stronger ally of the enemy or by other factors which make the prosecution unprofitable at a higher level of

conflict.

Western Perception of War

A second reason for the Western pre-occupation with high level conflict over LIC, is rooted in the Western perception of war. By the turn of the 20th Century, Western democratic countries were well evolved and progressing on a path of stable and prosperous nationhood. In most cases the revolutionary fires of change had been replaced by the processes of democracy. The West attributed its dynamism and prosperity to the superiority of its political system; it still does. The two most catastrophic events that upset this progress were World War I and World War II. The Western perception of war points to the waste of resources and the disruption of evolutionary and peaceful progress. The world wars changed the status quo of global affairs to the current bipolarity, reducing the pre-eminence of most Western powers, such as The United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Perhaps the only Western power to profit, in any way, from the wars was the United States. And even then, it was thrust into the demanding and unenviable role of Western leadership. After World War II, the spectre of a dismembered Germany reminded the West of the consequences of losing a war. In the Western view, whatever good was gained out of the War was gained by winners. The subsequent development of Japan is a counterpoint to that view, but has remained over-shadowed by the nuclear destruction of Japanese cities. This event has continued to crystalized world attention on the possible fate

of losers in a future high level conflict.

World War II also acted as the catalyst of change and revolution in the Third World. It accelerated the Third World towards nationhood and dismembered empires. Eventhough many of these colonies were no longer profitable to the colonial powers, the war replaced the Western sense of evolutionary and paternal change with the fait accompli of revolution and a demand for self-determination. Consequently, the West was involved in wars that did not conform to Western perception, e.g. Algeria and Palestine., Moreover, these wars could not be won by the tried and tested methods of previous successes and showed little respect for the military might of which the West was proud. These wars helped to perfect the strategies of revolution employed in the LIC environment of today.

Given this history, it is not surprising that war is considered a very serious business in the West and generally unprofitable, regardless of who wins. The Judaic-Christian-Greco-Roman-Renaissance-Enlightenment-Scientific tradition, supports this view of war. The West is unlikely to undertaken war lightly and would rather avoid direct involvement in LIC.(15). The West will fight for survival and national interest, but generally only when all other avenues of resolution have been exhausted, including the avenue of compromise.

There are significant advantages in engaging a militarily superior state that is reticent to go to war in a

level of conflict below that perceived as "war". This is especially if the issues are not initially seen to threaten state survival. Insurgent strategy aims to exploit this characteristic by not only debilitating the military opposition but the national will to fight. This attack was used to good effect during the Vietnam war in the 1960's and 70's.

History of Mediocre Performance

A third reason for the post Vietnam reticence by some Western nations to address the conduct of LIC was as a result of the Western defeat in that war. Although the Western Allies were not defeated militarily, they were never-the-less defeated politically. The principal conflict of this type that the West has been able to hold up as a success is the Malaya Campaign of 1948 to 1959. (16) The relevance of that campaign for future LIC is arguable. Even in other areas of LIC, such as peacekeeping, the West has been thwarted more often than not. (17) No-one willingly chooses a method of combat in which they believe they are unable to win or in which they have been hitherto unsuccessful. This is one reason why TIC has proliferated and insurgency remains a favoured strategy of potential enemies of the West. It is also the soundest reason for the West to acquire competence in LIC, and counter-insurgency in particular

Although formulated in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, the Australian doctrine for counter-insurgency operations addresses the danger of surrendering initiative in

the LIC environment and is relevant to the West:

Resolutions to avoid involvement in 'foreign' or 'internal' wars irrespective of their origin or motivation will only encourage insidious Communist expansion. The time will eventually come when a stand will again have to be taken to contain it within acceptable limits, probably for reasons of trade and economics, if not ideological ones. Inevitably, such a stand will involve containment of insurgencies. Thus examination of the subject cannot be swept aside. It is imperative that an effective counter to Communist revolutionary techniques be devised and perfected." (18)

Asia and Latin America contains numerous developing democratic countries that are involved in counter-insurgency and require aid from developed Western countries. While countries such as the US term this aid as Foreign Internal Defence Operations (19), the nature of the conflicts will range from terrorism through insurgency to guerrilla warfare and possibly to the extent of mid-intensity war, as experienced in Vietnam (20). These conflicts are likely to threaten the very survival of the state and the level, quantity, duration, and spirit of the aid must be cognizant of this fact. The survival of Western democratic states is entwined with the promotion of stability and the self-determination of allies, rather than an introspective and isolationist policy (21). Foreign and defence policies that are based on principles of "isolationism", "non-alignment", and purely self-defence, surrender initiative and limit options in a LIC environment.

Not a Matter of Survival.

Most western democratic countries have yet to experience

the threat of LIC within their own borders. That is, while LIC may threaten national interest, it has yet to threaten national survival. These conflicts have been played out generally in the Third World, with the exception of terrorism, which is a relatively small, although dramatic, aspect of the conflict spectrum. However, the possible need for the conduct of LIC within the democratic state, in the form of Aid-to-the Civil-Power (22) or counter-insurgency, should not be overlooked. The need for such a contingency has been demonstrated in the USA by the call out of National Guard units to quell civil disturbances, and in the United Kingdom with the British Army commitment to Northern Ireland. In Australia, in areas of low threat the most creditable near term scenarios are those which hypothesise externally sponsored insurgency and terrorism for limited diplomatic or economic gains, and as an adjunct of more peaceful strategies. (23) There are probably few democracies that contain a society so harmonious that interest or ethnic groups, desiring separation from the state or a change of status quo by extra-legal means, do not exist. (24) In the future such groups may grow in power and violence by utilizing the international drug trade to an extent requiring military aid to the police. The drug trade itself may import the opportunity for foreign inspired insurgency within the West Appropriate 'till Now!

The final rationale for the state of military preparedness in Western democracies today, is

appropriateness. Nuclear and conventional global wars have been prevented since World War II by "deterrence" and the principle of a balance of power. Instead of seeking to redress that balance with a quantitative gain, antagonists of all kinds, have moved towards the other end of the conflict spectrum to redress the balance with a qualitative application of violence.

The military in the West moves by evolution rather than revolution. It is responsive to change providing the change is perceived or predicted. The West analyses the history of conflict as a guide for the future. However, it is debateable whether sufficient effort has been spent on analysing the future face of conflict as it may be, and as we intend to make it.

WESTERN VULNERABILITY

General

The Western democratic state possesses some inherent vulnerabilities in the LIC environment. A significant segment of the revolutionary strategies which operate in this environment have either evolved or been initiated to exploit these vulnerabilities. In other aspects of the LIC environment the tenet of successful operation may be in contrast to the Western perception of war-fighting and therefore ignored. This is not to stress that the democratic state must be forever besieged by insurgency and reactive in the LIC arena. Many of these vulnerabilities are also found in non-democratic states and many affect equally the

performance of the state in higher levels of conflict. It is to stress that these vulnerabilities must be recognized and taken into consideration in the preparation for, and conduct of LIC.

The Individual Versus the State

A corner stone of Western democracy is the creation of an environment in which individual freedom is balanced against social responsibility. The competing needs of individuals and the state are resolved by peaceful and institutionalized means: The democratic state does not discourage dissension, but recognizes its legitimacy within the state and the "rules". This characteristic ceases to be a strength when the means for resolving dissension are undeveloped, or perceived as inadequate or unfair, i.e., when the "rules" are considered illegitimate. Then, the inherent belief in an individual's right to follow will and maximize potential, coupled with a belief in the legitimacy of dissension, creates the environment of revolution. The quandary for the democratic state is that it not only recognizes the legitimacy of dissent but creates an open and free society in which dissent may be manipulated into subversion.

While the democratic state recognizes the legitimate right of individuals to revolt against an oppressive state, it is sustained by a domestic commitment to peaceful change and is respectful of sovereign integrity. It is difficult to elicit public support for the promotion of violent revolution

in foreign countries unless exceptional circumstances exist. The ability of the West to operate with initiative in the LIC environment may be inhibited by public opinion and some inherent belief that the "means do not justify the end". This is particularly true when the nature of an operation does not fit the Western perception of what is fair or when the operation is not seen as essential to state survival. Quite often public opinion will apply personal or domestic moral analogy as a guide to the conduct of international affairs. Other political beliefs are not as constrained by this juxtaposition, nor operate with the same morality. The application of communist revolutionary theory can be particularly pragmatic. (25)

The West must be sympathetic to democratic revolution in developing countries stifled by corrupt and illegitimate government and maintained by foreign power. However, rarely can the West offer the dynamic "quick fix" that revolutionaries hope to achieve. Many of the problems of the Third World, unlike those of pre-revolutionary United States and France, call for an evolutionary change. By definition, the revolutionary wants dramatic and immediate change and more often than not, the goal is not democracy. Violent revolution alone cannot institute nor sustain democracy, whereas the well-developed and cohesive strategies of Leninism, Maoism, and the Cuban model, offer the revolutionary fervour a seemingly easier avenue to goals. Although it can be argued that revolution is as much a part

of democracy as any other political philosophy, the promotion of democratic revolution has lagged behind the Communist use of revolution. In this manner the West is seen as defensive and reactive, conducting counter-insurgency rather than insurgency. Efforts to promote such revolution have been furtive and secretive in a way as to avoid public debate and the likely debilitation of effort. This procedure in itself reduces the options and the power that the democratic state can employ in the conflict. Further-more, if the operation is discovered then subsequent opposition may be intensified, and any political embarrassment magnified. Centralized and totalitarian states are unlikely to be so constrained by public opinion.

Democratic Public Opinion

The responsiveness of the state to public opinion is the central strength and appeal of democracy. It is also a central weakness in the conduct of a sustained and protracted strategy. Consensus by committee is not necessarily an efficient way to win a conflict. In a climate of free speech public opinion is accessible to foreign and internal foes with their campaigns of disinformation. Uninformed public opinion is particularly vulnerable to psychological manipulation, which in turn can motivate a population to rebel, reject or acquiesce, and can undermine the will of the opposition and their supporters.

In the conduct of LIC abroad, a democratic population may fail to identify the conflict as akin to a "war". It may

fail to appreciate the long term consequences of losing the conflict and it may not believe it deserving of a total or large commitment, especially over a protracted time. This is because the modern Western perception of war does not embrace war, or indeed conflict, as a natural condition of mankind. Instead, democratic societies view war as an aberration in which the expenditure of resources is rarely profitable regardless of the outcome. Hence, war or anything resembling it is under-taken with much public debate. And in a democracy it requires the support of the people to divert resources from constructive use to a substantial war effort. Often public opinion dictates that the conduct of war be geared towards achieving a favourable and efficient result as quickly as possible. To this end, the short-term application of superior force is considered a valid strategy. But if the threat is not directly seen to immediately endanger the democratic population itself, then it will be reticent to support a protracted conflict which is perceived as another's fight and appears unwinnable. If this perception includes a doubt as to the moral and ethical right of the nation to conduct the conflict then democratic support will be difficult to attain or maintain.

The proliferation of the mass media and supporting technology will increasingly bring the actions of government and its agencies, such as the army, under public scrutiny. This scrutiny is likely to be conducted without all the facts of a situation and from an environment often far removed from

the action.

The Short Term Outlook

The philosophical outlook of a democratic society contains a certain hedonism which has been acquired as an extension of individualism and the relative material prosperity gained following World War II. The hedonistic view tends to shorten the outlook towards achievable and tangible rewards within the short term. When this domestic short-sightedness is coupled with the frequent election of state officials, then it is even more difficult to maintain a long term and cohesive stance in the LIC environment. Assuredly, this process of change allows the redress of performance, however this positive aspect must be balanced with the virtue of "persistence" which is required in all endeavours.

Profit

The need for tangible reward is reflected in that aspect of capitalism requiring a discernible and substantial profit from every endeavour. In the extreme this motive limits state foreign policy and the expenditure of resources in the conduct of seemingly "unprofitable conflict". While this concern balances adventurism and encourages state accountability, it can prevent an effective counter to the opposing strategies of protracted conflict. (26) It may dictate the use of inappropriate and expedient measures that exacerbate the root causes of the conflict, and indeed prove the conflict to have been unprofitable. The provision of security assistance funds tied to a design of short term

material profit is unlikely to assist a Third World country.

If the provision of foreign aid is in effect designed to exploit the beleaguered country rather than build self-sufficiency, then it is more likely to exacerbate the conflict. After all, this is one of the practices that created the present instability within the Third World.

Cultural Arrogance

Another inhabiting factor for Western democracies in conducting LIC outside of their own immediate defence is their "cultural arrogance". This arrogance is as a result of their relative strength and prosperity in comparison to most of the countries in which the LIC environment is likely to arise, particularly the Third World. It may also be manifest by a strong belief that it is the superiority of their democratic system, over and above geographical and historic luck, that has given rise to this strength and prosperity. This is in part human nature, but it can lead to poor performance in the LIC environment if this attitude is not understanding of the root causes of the conflict and neither sympathetic nor respectful of the local allies. It can lead to a dictatorial and patronizing approach that fails to recognize the need for self-determination and the development of an internal solution. It can embroil the supporting country in a protracted conflict and foreign occupation akin to neo-colonialism.

It may also be argued that the Western attitude towards the problems of the Third World is tinged with a "guilt

complex" because of the disparity in wealth and the past and present exploitation of these countries by the West. Such an attitude is vulnerable to manipulation and emotionalism which inhibits a rational approach to LIC.

A further extension of "Western cultural arrogance" may be the attempt to impose a Western solution as a template on a problem that must be solved within a regional context of culture and history. A templated solution may be proffered as a condition of domestic support from within the Western state. It may not be enough that the supporting forces and statesmen be understanding of the local situation, but public opinion from abroad must be supportive. This is difficult to obtain if the beleaguered country is anything but a clone of the supporting state's perception of democracy. It appears an ironic quirk of democratic public opinion that it can respect a "winner" as a logical validation of democracy's just reward and secretly scorn a loser as unworthy, and still it can be ernoted to sympathy for an underdog and disrespect for state leadership. The need is for education and information to remove the destabilizing effects of emotional public response on the conduct of state and the prosecution of conflict.

Willingness to Compromise

As the peaceful resolution of conflict has been institutionalized within the democratic state, so has the process of compromise grown in favour. When this characteristic is coupled with other factors, such as the state's reticence to enter a war or engage in seemingly

unprofitable endeavours, then it is susceptible to the facade of "reasonableness". This strategy forces confrontation to a point below that of war and relents with an offer of compromise that takes a very small objective. The process is repeated until the state has been debilitated by degrees. This is an ancient covert tactic. The defense is manoeuvre and counter-nibble or dogmatism and escalation, or a combination of both. If at some point in LIC the state and the democratic population must be committed to offense, it is best before the battle begins. The state's ultimate defense is still its ability and willingness to wage war at so high a level that the enemy risks defeat in combat.

A State for Peace

Perhaps the greatest inhibition that the democratic state poses in the LIC environment, or any war environment, is the fact that the democratic state is designed for peace and not war. it respects and values life in this world and aims to maximize the potential of that life. it has difficulty in comprehending and therefore countering those philosophies that preach destabilization in perpetuity, (27) and that use it as a tactic to achieve goals. The West has largely outgrown the need for martyrdom, outside of war.

Western democratic armies reflect their society and also the strengths and weaknesses of those societies. it is beyond the scope of this paper to enumerate those weaknesses but it suffices that many of the characteristics of men and organizations vital for success in war are not readily

fostered within a peacetime environment. As that peacetime environment is prolonged the more difficult it is to maintain the art of warfare and to focus on the skills for success in battle. In short, an army may be debilitated by peace. With only small wars to contest, the West may forget or ignore the practice and lessons of high level conflict. Already, many of the soldiers and officers have no real experience in war. There is a danger that higher level conflict may be regarded as an academic theory while the practice of lower level conflict may debilitate forces and distort tactics and strategy beyond usefulness in the next war.

FUTURE CONFLICT

The utility of LIC and the West's poor performance hitherto in this level of conflict is justification for the preparation of an army for future LIC. In order to balance this preparation against other competing needs a realistic assessment of the future face of conflict is required. It is possible to derive from the extrapolation of history and current trends some probable scenarios of the future. It must be realized that the generic grouping of the "West" precludes the examination of the minutia of each country and its relationships which is necessary to gain a "truer" vision of the future. However, the dynamism and multitude of variable factors should dictate a general view of the future, rather than one that ties the preparation for future conflict to a specific scenario. This is not to prevent the formulation of contingency planning but rather to maintain the inherent

flexibility necessary for responding to the constant review of contingency planning that must take place. The state will need to maintain in all departments those multitude of area experts that play "what if? games".

Bearing this in mind, the following prediction on the future of LIC is a useful start point:

The next twenty years will be a period of small conflicts--wars of opposition or liberation, wars fuelled within or as proxies of larger powers, conflicts below the level of war but with the power to topple nations or cripple governments.

...The future does not offer the prospect of less conflict than the past: in fact, the political entropy we face suggests an increasing breakdown of the established order and thus more, smaller conflicts. (28)

While it is probable that in the near term LIC will continue to be the most likely level of conflict, it is unrealistic to view it in isolation. In some regions LIC will occur in isolation, but it is also likely to spill over the boundaries of its definition and equally likely to occur in concert with a higher level of conflict. If LIC is viewed as an entity in isolation, then the resultant response is to seek a solution in specialization of forces, strategy, and tactics, whether such a response is appropriate or not. If recent history is indeed a trend, then LIC will continue in concert with at least mid-intensity conflict. Since 1975 there have been twelve conflicts involving substantial commitments of conventional forces. (29) The concept of a general army should not be precluded so early. (30)

Perhaps a scenario that better expresses the concept of

multi-dimensional and inter-related conflict lies within this passage:

The three components of armed conflict—conventional war, guerrilla war, and terrorism—will coexist in the future, with both governments and subnational groups employing them individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously, as well as being required to combat them...

Warfare in the future will be less destructive than the first half of the twentieth century, but less coherent.

Warfare will cease to be finite. The distinction between war and peace will dissolve...

...Armed conflict will not be confined by national frontiers. ...

With continuous, sporadic armed conflict, blurred in time and space, waged on several levels by a large array of national and subnational forces, warfare in the last quarter of the twentieth century will come to resemble warfare in the Italian Renaissance or warfare in the early seventeenth century, before the emergence of national armies. (31)

There is no doubt that man will possess the means of technology to wage conflict in a truly multidimensional and multi-level manner across the globe. (32) But states are only likely to do so if it is to their advantage and they can maintain control of the battle. It is debatable that a state will embark on such a strategy if it is likely to lead to the type of anarchy portrayed in the above prediction. Such turmoil could easily bring about the uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons. While sub-national groups may not be so constrained by the fear of identification, reprisal and anarchy, they must first obtain the resources necessary to project significant violence and it must be possible to fulfil their objectives by this action.

Herein lies a fundamental fact of future conflict: Until

such time as a method of sure nuclear defence renders nuclear weapons obsolete then conflict will be conducted in their shadow. The variable is whether the present system of restraint emplaced by deterrence and the state system will remain valid.

It is also true that the increasing inter-relationship of states makes it highly unlikely that regional wars will remain exclusively regional affairs. At least in the near future the Soviet Union will continue to seek global expansion and the United States will oppose it and promote "The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world." (33) This bipolarity is likely to be challenged, if not eroded, by the economic rise of such countries as Japan and China (34) in the twenty-first century. The rise of these countries will introduce new factors and further complicate the conduct of conflict.

This increased complication will also be as a result of changes in technology that give the super-powers the ability to control seemingly "incoherent warfare" with improved sensors, communications and information processing. This technology will flow to minor powers and subnational groups and be coupled with a world-wide diffusion of advanced weapons (35), including nuclear weapons. This development is likely to reduce the stability of the current international system and to remove some of the inhibitions currently preventing the escalation of LIC. For example, an antagonistic Third World country may see the utility in

employing one tactical nuclear bomb against an enemy instead of a long and debilitating border conflict or an expensive conventional war which it can not afford. Furthermore, it may well reason that an ally of the enemy, such as the USA or the USSR, will not risk "mutually assured destruction" over a country not vital to their survival. The same logic will apply to the future use of chemical and biological weapons. The increased likelihood of terrorism and the probability that high-technology weapons will be acquired or provided to subnational groups will be a destabilizing and complicating factor in future conflict. (36) A terrorist act may well precipitate not LIC but general war.

It appears that as the world plays "catch up" the lesser powers will increasingly gain the ability to wage a higher level of warfare outside of the constraints which prevent such conflict today. Countries will move towards the military power once only the domain of the developed states. Conversely, the super-powers will move into technology, such as "stealth" aircraft, directed energy, and space systems, that allows them the option of more discriminating violence (37) by precision conventional weapons as opposed to the bludgeon of nuclear force.

It is in front of this backdrop that deterrence based on "mutually assured destruction" must be re-evaluated as it has global implications for all countries, particularly those who perceive their interests entwined with an effective strategic balance (38). It also effects the preparation of an army for

LIC as it cannot be undertaken oblivious to other threats. Particularly as these threats may lurk beneath the surface of a LIC scenario. It is likely that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation will not alone deter the use of nuclear or conventional forces in the future unless such use was directed against the very survival of the countries that possesses them. (39) It is unlikely that such a threat can be translated into action in the case where tactical nuclear weapons are employed in gaining a limited objective or where the enemy cannot be clearly identified and isolated. The threat of mutually assured destruction is now less credible. (40) It is based on an extreme contingency and is not cognizant of the need for discriminating responses to other contingencies. A strategy must comprehensively counter all the enemy's options. No longer is nuclear or general war confined to the monolithic nature of previous perception.

LIC is to continue in the Third World where an imbalance of conditions are such that an acceptable status quo has yet to be achieved. But there are likely to be scenarios of LIC within developed countries(41) as the complexity of these societies balance new needs and challenges. Challenges such as overpopulation, the assimilation of large ethnic groups, resource shortages, and the threat of pollution or diseases like AIDS. LIC will continue to be a tool of interstate competition in much the same way as economics and diplomacy are tools. It will be employed by those groups without the power of statehood and those who seek to establish trans-

national influence.

There will continue to be peacetime contingencies that arise unexpectedly and the need to employ military forces in peacekeeping functions. The preparation of an army for these scenarios must be integrated into the preparation of the army for both mid and high level conflict. Both remain a greater threat and only by being prepared to conduct both are they kept as a less likely threat than LIC. In the rationale of Discriminate Deterrence:

Our strategy must also be integrated. We should not decide in isolation questions about new technology, force structure, mobility and bases, conventional and nuclear arms, extreme threats and Third World conflicts. We need to fit together our plans and forces for a wide range of conflicts, from the lowest intensity and highest probability to the most apocalyptic and least likely. (42)

CHAPTER FOUR

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TYPES OF LIC

INSURGENCY

A Definition

Insurgency is ... a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously uses political resources and violence to either destroy or regormulate the basis of ligitimacy for aspects of politics that the non-ruling group believes illigitimate under existing conditions." (1)

Insurgency is a common basis for many of the LIC

Insurgency is a common basis for many of the LIC

scenarios in which the West will be involved. It requires a qualitative fighting relevant to war in general which warrants the study of all military professionals regardless of background.

Insurgency is a revolt or rebellion against the government of a state by elements of the state. It is primarily conducted within a country, but it may also be fought in dimensions outside of the state, such as in the international media. While the root causes that give rise to insurgency are nearly always domestic, they may be exploited by an external state or inhibited by external force. Thus, insurgency may have both interstate and intrastate factors. The balance of power generally favours the government in the intital stages of insurgency, thus forcing the insurgents to utilize a strategy that reduces the advantage of the government's superior military forces (2) and progressively debilitates that advantage. The insurgent will undertake concurrent and coordinated action in the dimensions of the economic, political, psychological, and social fabric of a

society to redress the balance of power.

In a few cases, the active demonstration of insurgency may be the catalyst to release pent-up oppression that quickly redresses the balance of power. This is often the vision and rhetoric of the idealist insurgent, who imbued with a mixture of ideologies, sees a spontaneous uprising of the masses under his leadership. It is generally harder to overthrow an established status quo unless the "revolution" springs from some major catastrophe to a society. A protracted effort is normally required to effect a successful insurgency.

Causes

The basis for the successful fostering or prevention of insurgency lies in an understanding of the causes of revolt.

Some of the fundamental causes are: (3)

- * social inequality;
- * poverty;
- * religious differences;
- * ethnic, tribal and racial differences and rivalry;
- * rapid change, e.g. from rural agricultural environment to the urbanization often associated with industrialization;
- * disruption of traditional customs and values;
- * lack of progress and opportunity in economic, technological, educational and social aspects;
- * overpopulation;

- * a catastrophe;
- * foreign threat or domination, and nationalism: and
- * ideological beliefs, which can be ruled as secular,
- * religious, ethnic, or cultural.

The presence of any or all of these conditions does not necessarily precipitate revolt. There must be a belief that a better condition is possible. This belief is a perception of relative deprivation (4) or "rising expectations". If men believe themselves deprived or want "more", then they will look at the government or another society and decide whether their condition is as a result of the government policies and the social structure from which it comes. It is ironic that men often fail to accept their condition as a result of their own doing or that of fate/luck. It is not divine intervention that some governments are so actively aligned with religion stressing the inevitability of higher design in the state of affairs.

For an insurgency to persist and grow there are normally contributing weaknesses within the government, such as:

- * corruption and discrimination,
- * inertia or over-reaction,
- * maladministration and incompetence,
- * unstable political system, and
- * foreign manipulation and exploitation.

If the country's problems are as a result of its former history or paucity of resources, it may be beyond immediate solution by even a well-meaning government. It is difficult

to redress problems that have built over centuries if the state has nothing of material value. It is then reliant on charity and foreign investment and in effect gives up sovereign determination for survival. Any combination of these causes may accelerate the swell of uprising, especially if a precedent can be found to illustrate the successful redress of similar problems by revolution.

Factors

Once a basis of insurgency exists then its success or failure is dependent on the following factors; (5)

- * organization and leadership,
- * cohesion,
- * environment,
- * popular support,
- * external support,
- * government response, and
- * time.

Organization and Leadership.

The basis for initiating and exploiting dissent is a cohesive and adequate organization under the leadership of politically and militarily astute leaders. Depending on the ultimate goals and the environment, the organization may be conspiratorial or mobilizational. Whatever the size it must be adequate to conduct the battle and eventually capable of running the state. Its size must be consistent with the need to initially operate covertly and to maintain cohesion of effort. It will undoubtedly grow with success and increasing

responsibility. It will need intelligence to retain initiative and will need to infiltrate the government infrastructure to gain both intelligence and familiarity with the running of government. Once within the governmental organizations, it may act like a cancer. It may usurp the functions of government from within or establish an alternative and parallel government.

Cohesion

It will be a task for the insurgent leadership to establish, maintain, and expand a unity of purpose within the movement. The leadership will initially exploit the various motives for revolt and weave them into a common goal and strategy. The leadership will require flexibility in playing up cohesive elements and playing down divisive ones. It will be necessary to reconcile internal differences and in order to attract wide popular support some dissimilar groups may have to be courted. Of ten, membership may be conferred only by a mutual hatred of the government. In the quest for group unity the leadership will have to be careful not to compromise the consistency of ideals, means, and goals. Often the real goals of the leadership are camouflaged beneath more palatable aims in order to win popular support and to disguise the real threat the insurgency poses.

Environment

The insurgent needs both a favourable physical and demographic environment in which to operate. It must be easy for the insurgent to physically disappear into the terrain

to avoid decisive battle with the government. He must possess and maintain an advantage of relative mobility over the government. The environment must provide for the concealment of bases and it must be suitable for guerrilla warfare. It should provide an opportunity for progressive domination. Jungle, mountains and cities provide such terrain, although insurgency has also been effected in open and desert terrain.

Likewise the insurgent must blend in with the general population so that the government will be forced to consider all of its citizens as potential enemies. The government may even be goaded into severe and draconian measures to control the population which will exacerbate root causes and move the popular support towards the insurgent. The insurgent will try to exploit social cleavages within the society to break down the existing homogeneity and cohesion of will to resist. Popular Support.

The support of the people is the singular most important factor in determining the success of the insurgency. This support is either active or passive. (6) If the population is actively in support of the cause then it will provide material, intelligence, medical aid, shelter and recruits for the cause. In this manner, the initial advantage the government enjoyed by possessing the police, army and institutionalized resources will be balanced. Passive supporters are also important as they do not betray the insurgents and aid the government. The means by which an

insurgency might gain popular support are: (7)

- * charismatic attraction;
- * ideological appeal;
- * focus attention on real problems;
- * terrorism for coercion, fragmentation of social rifts, and alienation of impotent government;
- * provoking oppressive and indiscriminate government responses; and
- * demonstrating possession of the initiative by providing for the peoples' needs and military success.

External Support

External support to an insurgency is critical to help offset the advantage of the government. This is usually in the form of moral and political support, material, sanctuaries, and in some cases the provision of covert operations. The insurgent is particularly vulnerable to manipulation by external forces through the provision of this support.

Government Response

The correct government response will be the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, which will be addressed in the following section. It should be noted that despite the ambiguity of the enemy, he does not automatically possess the initiative within insurgency. After all, the government possesses the balance of power and if it acts with a cohesive

and responsive strategy it may undermine or destroy the revolt in its infancy. Quite often it is not the insurgents that win power but the government that gives it up. A government should not give up its option of coercive violence to eliminate insurgency. Within democracies, this option normally carries the restriction that the application of force will be discriminating and surgical.

Insurgent intention is to develop power covertly until it is capable of standing on its own. Then the use of that power is to destroy the government in a time, place, and manner favourable to the insurgent. Therefore, the government must be kept in reactive and over-reactive modes. It must be forced to defend everywhere and to undertake policies that not only eat up vigor but magnify the root causes of the conflict. It must be made to look inept and not deserving of legitimacy. Wherever possible it must be alienated from external support.

Time.

In most cases, insurgency is a strategy of protracted effort. It requires time to insinuate an infrastructure and to develop a cohesive and comprehensive strategy and organization. It takes time to debilitate the government and to change the balance of power unless the government is already on the verge of collapse. It is during this time that the government may seize the initiative or the very root causes of the dissension may be resolved by evolutionary change. Timing for the insurgent is critical. He cannot

afford to show his hand before he is able to move events in the direction of his goals. It is debatable that rebellion is spontaneous unless the root causes are already present and smouldering, awaiting the fan of some traumatic event to substantially remove the inhibiting factors. Rarely can an insurgent bring to bear that traumatic event in the initial phase of insurgency.

Types of Insurgency

An examination of the varying types of insurgency reveals that western democracy need not always be defensive in this area of conflict. There are opportunities for the fostering of insurgency within an illegitimate regime. The types of insurgency as defined by bard E. O'Neill in "The Analysis of Insurgency", are:

- * Secessionist - to withdraw from one state and establish a new state.
- * Democratic - to establish a democratic state.
- * Revolutionary - to impose a new governmental and social structure based on egalitarian values and central control. It is designed to mobilize the people.
- * Restorational - to re-impose a recent traditional order. e.g. often based on elitism and oligarchies.
- * Reactionary - to re-institute an historical order from the distant past which is deemed responsible
[UNABLE TO READ ORIGINAL TEXT]
- * Conservative - to maintain the status quo in the face of an impending change.

- * Reformist - to change elements of the status quo in order to remove discrimination.
- * Anarchistic - to eliminate all institutionalized government.

Insurgent Strategy.

Each insurgency is unique to the time, place and circumstances and must be appreciated as such. However, there are four broad strategic models (9) that insurgents generally adopt and vary for their purposes, often combining;

- * Leninist,
- * Maoist,
- * Foco (Cuban), and
- * Urban.

Leninist.

In this strategy, a small and well-disciplined conspiratorial group form a party to exploit grievances that have largely alienated elements of the population from the government. The insurgent purpose is normally revolutionary, and it is not incompatible with other goals. The party will seek support from discontented groups, such as the working class or even the military itself. It does not seek to bring the general population into the running of the government, but it will mobilize segments for mass support in riots and demonstrations. This strategy is normally effected in the vicinity of the economic and political power bases in the

urban centres.

Leninist strategy assumes large scale disaffection from a government which can no longer be assured of military and police loyalty. It requires a government that will collapse in the face of strong opposition, such as terrorism and mass demonstrations, and no longer holds a balance of power. This condition can occur as a result of the actions of the movement or by other factors which it exploits. Most states are not particularly susceptible to this strategy unless inherently weak or at a debilitated stage. Debilitation may follow a catastrophe or the prolonged application of another insurgent strategy such as the Maoist strategy. It is not surprising therefore that some revolutions are touted as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. This is an expression that an elite leadership hope to overthrow the government by mobilizing the populace but not to the extent that the general populace will share in the governing process. That function is to be effected on its behalf by a self-perpetuating elitist party, which, by its own definition, knows what is best for society.

Maoist

Maoist strategy is by far the most practical and developed insurgent strategy, and it has been the most successful in application. China and Vietnam are the shining examples of its success. It is the most likely and perhaps dangerous strategy that the West will confront in the Third World.

The Maoist strategy assumes that the government is in a

superior position of power and that it is well entrenched and unlikely to fall without a protracted and significant effort. It is a strategy to fight "out-numbered and win". It effects this victory by a phased battle in which the government is debilitated by degrees through conflict in areas and means in which it is not strong. Each phase precipitates the next as the battle is logically extended. The strategy may escalate or diminish, the conflict depending on the conditions. The strategy is heavily reliant on the factors of organization and leadership, popular support, suitable environment, and time.

The strategy is conducted in three main phases;

* Phase One-Passive Phase: (also referred to as "political organization-terrorist" or "latent and incipient insurgency" phase,) In this phase the insurgent organization and infrastructure is emplaced. Within a democracy this phase may go unnoticed, appearing as the normal friction that occurs during peaceful competition. A communist regime regularly purges itself of dissension. (10)) The phase is characterized by Political and social action designed to exploit the seeds of discontent and isolate the people from the government. The phase concludes with increased violence in the form of sabotage, small scale raids and terrorism.

* Phase Two-Active Phase: ("guerrilla warfare" phase.) In the active phase the utilization of violence is increased to the extent of guerrilla warfare. The battle is continued in all dimensions to make the government defend

everywhere (11) and disperse its efforts. The guerrilla stage establishes the basis of a more substantial military organization and effort. The establishment of this base is dependent upon how much of the military resources belonging to the government can be usurped and captured, or how much can be provided by external support. In Third World countries where neither government nor insurgent initially possesses significant military resources, then the provision of external support to one or the other may have a decisive affect on the outcome of the conflict.

* Phase Three-Counter-Offensive Phase: ("mobile-conventional warfare" or "war of movement" phase.) When it is evident that the military balance has swung in favour of the insurgent, the guerrilla warfare is supplemented with mobile warfare. Towards the end of the insurgency the military dimension may resemble limited war. The multi-dimensional and multi-level strategy, as applied in the Vietnam war, will be maintained throughout the struggle: "Not only does the counter insurgent have to defend everywhere he must fight in two types of conflict." (12) When the government is facing conventional warfare then it is close to defeat. It is in this condition of desperation that the government may seek the intervention of substantial outside support, such as combat forces, from the Western block. It is this situation that the West needs to avoid by the earlier provision of support commensurate with preventing the escalation of conflict. The alternate strategy is to allow deterioration of

the situation and the formation of visible insurgent forces against which the superior conventional force of the government and the supporting Western country can be brought to bear. This form of brinkmanship may have application within the overall strategy of counter-insurgency, but it is a risk. It will still require fighting the insurgency back through the phases as it withdraws to a level of conflict in which it can survive and recuperate for the next bout. It may be an enforced strategy by a public opinion that requires crisis motivation.

The three phases can be identified in most insurgent's strategy, Maoist or otherwise. In many cases the insurgent's strategy and appeal is such that it fails to move past the first phase and remains a permanent aggravation within the society, oscillating from peaceful competition to acts of subversion and terrorism. In other cases, what commences as insurgency escalates quickly to civil war, foreign intervention and war. It should be noted that the concluding stage of Maoist insurgency is not confined to LIC but more in the realm of mid-intensity conflict.

Foco (Cuban)

A variation of the Maoist strategy is that provided by the Cuban model and Che Guevara (13). Instead of relying on a revolutionary condition to arise, this strategy is based on accelerating the process by giving whatever grievances that exist a catalyst. That catalyst is not a political party but the existence of armed revolt by a core of guerrillas. The

party and leadership is to spring from this core, the guerrilla foco. Like a rolling snowball the conduct of guerrilla warfare is to stimulate the conditions and progress of revolution.

The appeal of this strategy is that it is easier to initiate and requires less organizational groundwork, time and external support. The revolution can be highly visible from the start, where the populace are disenchanted and the government weak: such action may be enough to quickly force capitulation or concessions. It is easy to start an insurgency with this strategy in undeveloped countries, among simple rural populations, in countries with difficult terrain and where the population is susceptible to emotional appeal. It is harder to bring it to a success against a government that holds centralized control of the economy, military and politics, unless the groups that hold that sway defect to the insurgent cause. Equally, an insurgent would have difficulty in establishing the organization and infrastructure of Maoist strategy under these conditions. Insurgents that lack the patience, sophistication and opportunity required for Maoist strategy are likely to attempt the Cuban model with significant external support. This strategy is unlikely to be successful without this support.

Urban

The urban model is really the employment of terrorism within the urban areas to destabilize society and government. The object is to create crises in which the inactivity or

over-reaction of the government alienates the population. Due to the complexity of cities and the freedom and anonymity possible within Western democratic cities in particular, it is relatively easy to create chaos. It is debatable whether this action alone is sufficient to carry insurgency to victory. It is more an adjunct to other strategy; tying forces to urban protection and creating paranoia and fear that inhibits the logical and cohesive response of the government in other areas. Since it uses terror, a double edged tactic, it is also subject to alienating the population. It may focus attention on matters and indirectly bring about change, but it is not a comprehensive strategy as yet. If, however, urban insurgents were to acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons then they might constitute the most serious threat to both society and the government This is true for any insurgent acquiring an NBC capability.

Conclusion

As in all areas of conflict, the methods by which an insurgent may attempt to overthrow a government are only limited by imagination and resources. Insurgency can be defeated by the West, but more importantly prevented, both at home and abroad as long as it is acknowledged as a potential threat. Most insurgency that is serious enough to warrant military action will be in one of the Maoist classic phases when action is undertaken. But it should be noted that insurgency can rapidly escalate or diminish depending on the fortunes of the struggle. It can retreat to a state of

peaceful competition and is unlikely to be definitively destroyed while the root causes exist.

It is not the intention of the West to expand its interests by global of non-democratic states. But it must look seriously at supporting revolt against illegitimate governments imposed against the will of their people by external forces. The conduct of insurgency in this case is a matter of foreign policy and will include Unconventional Warfare, which may be conducted as LIC or in conjunction with a higher level of war. It is not the scope of this paper to examine the specialized aspects of UW.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The doctrine of counter-insurgency is both well developed and documented. (14) Now that insurgency is recognized as a more creditable threat then the doctrine is increasingly read and studied. Most nations have underway serious programmes to translate this doctrine into preparedness. The second half of this paper will largely deal with the problem of appropriate preparedness and the practical application of doctrine. Much of the doctrine of counter-insurgency is only an adaptation of basic war-fighting. It is therefore relevant to not only the whole spectrum of LIC, but not dissimilar to war-fighting in general. This point is not always understood or accepted by those who lean towards specialization in all ventures.

For Western nations counter-insurgency is conducted within two theatres: at home and abroad. The likelihood of

nation is minimal, although should not be discounted. For example, a small scale foreign incursion, resembling insurgency, has been for many years touted as the most likely threat to Australia. (15) While the USA possesses the National Guard as the basis of military aid to local government (16) other nations utilize the army as Aid-to-the-Civil-Power. The conduct of these operations is similar to counter-insurgency in principle and doctrine. An indigenous force may be aiding the police force in the conduct of limited counter-insurgency and also receive economic aid to redress the root causes of the problem. In an escalated situation security forces may be assisted by forces from a neighbouring country conducting counter-guerrilla warfare in a border region. The problem is not one of semantics but of objective. The goal of all participants must be one and the same; defeat the counter-insurgency and restore stability to the stage. Along the way the interests of nation building and national interest may be achieved.

Basis of Success.

The basis of success in counter-insurgency is found in the follow principles; (17)

- * Prevention of counter-insurgency is the ultimate objective. Prevention lies in monitoring all facets of the state to address problems before they emerge or being responsive to them as they are identified. This objective is achieved by balanced nation building and the institution of responsive government.

* Mobilization of the entire national resources must be undertaken in a co-ordinated manner once insurgency is identified to prevent the escalation of the conflict.

* The support of the population must be obtained.

* Control over all areas untouched by the insurgent must be consolidated or established.

* The insurgent must be isolated, physically and psychologically

* The insurgent must be destroyed or brought to justice in a systematic manner.

* The conduct of the operation must be in accordance with the constitution, laws and culture of the country. In most cases this will be in accordance with the primacy of civil power, unless special legislation has been enacted.

If foreign assistance is to be required, then it must be complementary to the local strategy and be aimed at building self-sufficiency and not dependency. Such aid, however, is better requested before the onset of crisis.

During and after the insurgency, efforts must be undertaken to remove the root causes of the insurgency.

Strategic Principles

The following principles should guide the conduct of military operations without inhibiting the application of sound military tactics: (18)

* Unity of Effort. The strategy must encompass a cohesive and well co-ordinated response across all dimensions of the state and throughout the organizations responsible for

effecting it. The effort will be a joint military-civil action and may include combined forces. Responsibilities must be understood from the beginning and the appropriate integration of commands and liaison established. The military effort must always be seen to reflect the national goals and be supportive of the government. All participants must thoroughly understand the national, strategic and tactical objectives to be achieved.

* Maximize Intelligence. The acquisition and timely response to intelligence is vital in counter-insurgency. An integrated and centrally controlled system must be established, but it must be efficient and allow for tactical initiative. Intelligence includes the thorough appreciation of the enemy, the allied forces and the environment, both geography and demography. This appreciation must pass to the lowest level in the chain of command.

* Minimize Violence. This principle is probably the least understood of not only counter-insurgency, but LIC in general. It is best explained to the conventional military mind as an extension of using an "economy of force". where ever possible, only that amount of force necessary to achieve the objective should be used. In some LIC doctrine this is expressed a "minimal force". However, when translated to the tactical level this often imposes a dangerous and inhibiting perception. Both in war and LIC the military must understand the advantages and disadvantages employing maximum force or minimum force. Western armies must be imbued with the ethos

that the use and level of violence must be justified by the circumstances. Both in LIC, and war in general, the object must be the application of force in the appropriate quantity against the target of choosing when and where decided. The nature of the LIC environment normally dictates the surgical application of force. The requirement to prevent escalation and to protect non-combatants from injury must be stressed and enforced throughout the organization. In some cases the principle of "minimum force" may be incorporated in Rules of Engagement, while in other cases it may be appropriate to established a free fire zone.

* Security. All operations must be conducted in the realization that the enemy may strike anywhere and anytime and with considerable imagination. It is difficult for this security consciousness not to be manifest by a paranoia. It must be balanced with the circumstances of the threat and not prevent the normal functioning of the state and life in general. Security of information, personnel, and material is vital to avoid attrition of resources and to seize initiative from the enemy and in turn surprise him. Security must cover both overt and covert enemy activity.

* Systematic Approach. The counter-insurgency must be undertaken systematically. Unless the insurgent is inept or over-confident, then the government is unlikely to be presented with the opportunity for a coup de main or grace. While the government must seize the initiative where ever possible, this should be within the "framework" (19) of a

systematic plan of prevention, identification, isolation, destruction, and consolidation. The insurgent will tempt the government to over-react in a haphazard and uncoordinated manner. The biggest problem for the government will be a shortage of resources to effect a systematic programme simultaneously throughout the state. The government will be forced to consolidate positions of strength and expand from this base while conducting operations in depth in other areas. Operations in depth are designed to remove the initiative from the enemy and prepare the area for the introduction of a more systematic approach when increased resources become available.

* Seize and Retain the Initiative. This principle is a tenet of all conflict. Government action must contain an effective offensive plan. Initiative is retained in this level of conflict by well trained and mature soldiers in the field who have a thorough understanding of their responsibility and what is to be achieved. Centralized control and co-ordination of effort must not inhibit the initiative of those in the field. This point must be stressed in the utilization of intelligence. The West has not always been effective in the timely dissemination of appropriate intelligence to the right level. Intelligence overload has been a common problem. This can be addressed with data processing systems and advanced communications that links the man in the field with central banks of collated information almost instantaneously. These systems are employed daily by

modern police forces.

* Quality of Force. The government forces must be able to outlast, outfight and outmove the insurgents. The forces must be trained and conditioned to beat the insurgents man for man in the insurgents' environment and with the same equipment if necessary. If a force can achieve this then it will understand what is required to give it a true advantage. For example, a helicopter may not give an advantage of relative mobility in primary jungle where as a better boot may. To this nature of force is added the necessary equipment, weapons, mobility, administration, communications, and command, and, if required, superior quantity. The insurgent may then retain only one hope, a greater will to fight. As in all conflict, the will to fight is a critical variable. The indigenous and allied forces of the government must possess at least a will to fight equal to the insurgents. Wherever possible, indigenous forces should engage the insurgents in combat as the fight is for the survival of their state and they should have a better understanding of the situation. This principle is reinforced by other considerations such as external public support and the laws of supporting states. The philosophy that "more is better" should not be the maxim of counter-insurgency. The state will win if it fields a superior quantity and quality of forces in conjunction with an equal and co-ordinated effort in the other areas of government.

* Surprise. Offensive action alone will not gain the

government initiative. The insurgent must be constantly surprised to reduce his illusiveness and his options. Strategic surprise may be difficult to achieve in a systematic approach, but it should guide all tactical and framework operations. Surprise is achieved by out-thinking the insurgent. The mental activity of the military and police will be equally as important, if not more so, than physical activity in counter-insurgency

Considerations for Supporting States

The principles of strategy listed above are relevant to the conduct of counter-insurgency at home and abroad. However, there are additional considerations that are applicable to Western states supporting counter-insurgency abroad. These considerations should be appreciated in the light of earlier observations made on LIC and the West's vulnerabilities in this environment:

- * The conduct of counter-insurgency at home is in the defence of the state and related to national survival. The conduct of counter-insurgency abroad is in the pursuit of national interest and part of foreign policy.

- * counter-insurgency at home is likely to be a goal within itself, or at least an intermediate goal within nation building. The goals of counter-insurgency and nation building are likely to be intermediate goals for the supporting state whose ultimate aim may be increased political or economic power in the region.

- * The supporting state has the choice to enter the

conflict or not, and may withdraw at will or in accordance with other priorities. The besieged state must fight or acquiesce.

* The insurgency may be entirely instigated and controlled by an outside force and be in reality a foreign incursion. The insurgency may in effect be a LIC between external powers utilizing a third state as a battle ground.

* The local state may need external support to survive but exacerbate the root causes of the conflict by obtaining that support.

* The supporting state is accountable to a different public perception and law than that applicable to the conflict.

* By accepting support, the beleaguered state is vulnerable and in effect gives up sole measure of sovereignty while the supporting state gains a right of leverage in sovereign affairs. The troubled state may therefore request support only when a crisis is reached and the condition requires a large amount of support or is beyond help. Such a condition may embroil a state in a protracted effort beyond its capabilities.

* Unless it is the object to maintain a puppet state, which is not the acknowledged aim of Western foreign policy, then support must not create dependency.

* Unless the introduction of support is in the form of foreign intervention and neo-colonialism, then the conflict will be waged in accordance with the local environment and

determined largely by the local state. This may not be the method acceptable to the supporting state.

- * The insurgency may not only possess the ability to escalate to a regionally limited war, but it may precipitate a high intensity war world-wide.

Additional Guidelines for Supporting States.

The provision of Western support to counter-insurgency abroad should be in accordance with those already listed and these additional guidelines:

- * The counter-insurgency will be conducted as part of foreign policy and part of Foreign Internal Defence Operations (20). Foreign policy, the Foreign Defence Operations and the conduct of counter-insurgency must be consistent in objective and method with national policy and capabilities. The approach must be co-ordinated and cohesive throughout the agencies of the supporting state.

- * Despite what ever else the supporting power hopes to achieve, it must be committed to a team effort with the local country to defeat the insurgency.

- * The commitment to win must be a commitment to a protracted effort. There are few "quick fix" solutions to insurgency. The commitment should not be broken easily by whim, public emotionalism, battlefield setbacks or the change of political parties unless the original rationale has been largely invalidated. The West will certainly lose allies if unable to keep foreign commitments.

- * Both states must reach a treaty or agreement before

combined action is undertaken to reconcile fundamental differences of interest, responsibility, laws and operations. Ideally this should be achieved in time of peace as a contingency plan and be subject to periodic review, especially at the time of activation. The absence of such a plan should not preclude the provision of emergency support in time of crisis, but arrangements must be finalized soon after a commitment. A team effort cannot be effected unless all the players know and agree to the rules.

* The supporting state must recognize and respect the sovereignty of the local state and be prepared to work within rules that foster self-determination. That is, help the legitimate government re-establish control, undertake remedial action, and replace external support with domestic resources, as soon as possible.

* Both the supporting and supported states must be aware of the implications of "cultural arrogance" and ensure that all elements of both their countries, especially the public, are presented a balanced and factual appreciation of the other's country, its situation, and the rationale for support. This must especially include those who are responsible for dispensing the Support.

* Western states must monitor their allies to identify potential internal problems and provide advice and support to prevent insurgency. This is a diplomatic mission. An environment must be created in which aid, if it is likely to be needed, will be sought in a timely manner rather than

in a crisis.

* A Western democratic state possesses many non-violent resources that may be provided to an ally to prevent insurgency or to defeat it in its infancy. These include: political support, economic aid, high technology, and non-combatant material and advisers. Often the beleaguered state only requires military training and material to redress any external support being provided to the insurgents. The provision of combat forces to a foreign state should be as a last resort, and then within the type of bounds expressed by the former US Secretary of State, Weinberger: (21)

- o The provision of foreign combat forces must be vital to the interests of the supporting state or its allies.

- o Combat forces are committed with a clear intention of winning.

- o There must be clearly defined political and military objectives.

- o The forces must be consistent with the objectives (In particular, the goals must be achievable by combat forces.)

- o The commitment must have the sustained support of the public and the politicians.

Western democratic states must be committed to resolving conflict at the lowest level and understand the danger of allowing insurgency to escalate. Supporting states must expose the role of external states, if any, in the insurgency. Western states that are subjected to insurgency

at home or supporting counter-insurgency abroad must retain the option of waging a higher level of conflict on other states that support insurgency against legitimate governments. The West must be prepared to wage war on those states or sub-national groups that interpret a commitment to peace as a lack of resolve to defend national interest by war where necessary.

Military Operations Peculiar to Counter-Insurgency

There are few military operations that are peculiar to the conduct of counter-insurgency. Rather, it requires the employment of basic military skills and tactics to a high level of proficiency so as to avoid the necessity of the bludgeon approach to war-fighting by attrition or mass of force. It is often qualitative fighting rather than quantitative. However, it generally involves a significant size force in relation to the number of enemy and combat engagements. The philosophy of manoeuvre warfare is applicable to the conduct of counter-insurgency. There may be the necessity to utilize mass force. This will be difficult to avoid in the later stages of a Maoist-type insurgency as it escalates from guerrilla war to mobile war. There is a need for those responsible for translating the strategy into achievable tactics to be proficient in operational art and appreciating a complex and inter-related array of factors and resources. This same skill is required on the modern battle field where ever increasingly a multitude of complex factors will impact on the conduct of

war.

There will be less need for the means of mass destruction in the initial phases of insurgency. The employment of air and naval forces are more likely to be service support functions rather than direct combat. The the early stages of the "war" will be conducted on the ground. However, counter-insurgency is both a joint survive and combined arms task. While the emphasis is on infantry work, all the elements of a conventional force may be called upon. Some corps may be used in secondary or different roles, such as the use of static armour and the use of engineers in civil affairs construction. Indirect fire weapons must be available, but direct fire weapons, such as helicopter gunships, will often provide a more flexible and surgical option of fire. The increased precision of modern weapon systems will allow more fire power options. Those weapon systems not initially required must be available at short notice to be integrated into the effort in the event of escalation. In some cases where a supporting force comes to the rescue of a nation facing defeat, then a conventional army, complete with armour and air, may be introduced and then gradually withdrawn as the conflict regresses to LIC. Some LIC operations that incorporate basic tactics but are more commonly used in war by security forces, or rear area security, are:

- * cordon and search,
- * cordon and clear,

- * key point and installation security,
- * personnel security operations,
- * border protection, and
- * route and movement protection.

Operations in Death. (22) These operations are conducted in areas not yet under the control of the government. They are designed to disrupt and destroy insurgents, to remove their initiative until a more comprehensive and systematic effort can be made in the area. They do not aim to capture or hold territory, and employ similar tactics to operations in enemy or neutral territory during a war. A force is inserted and may or may not establish a base. A search, based on prior intelligence, is conducted to locate objectives or the force may be inserted near a known objective. The objective is destroyed or the enemy are captured, and the force withdrawn to a secure base or government controlled area. The most common operation within this type is the search and clear operation.

Special and Supporting Operations.

The following operations have particular relevance to counter-insurgency but are employed in all warfare. All armies must maintain a module of specialists in these fields for integration into a task force as required:

- * psychological operations;
- * civil affairs;
- * explosive ordinance disposal;
- * public relations operations;

- * water-borne operations;
- * special action force operations:
 - o reconnaissance and surveillance,
 - o ambush and harassing of insurgents,
 - o sabotage and demolition,
 - o training indigenous forces and Unconventional Warfare,
 - o covert operations, and
 - o counter-terrorist operations;
- * specialized communications, electronic warfare, and intelligence support;
- * liaison and language support; and
- * country and area specialists.

Summary

The overview of counter-insurgency points to the conduct of a conflict in a manner not dissimilar to that required for war. The complexity and demands of national strategy, foreign policy, military strategy and operational art are the same even though the level of violence may be less overall. The requirement for tactical and individual military proficiency is a high standard. A standard that befits an army in any war. The tactics of offense and defence are required, with particular emphasis on the type of operations undertaken for rear area security or to dominate a "no-man's land" beyond the FEBA. Not all of the equipment and weapons maintained by a conventional force will be needed unless the conflict escalates. The conflict is a land conflict although there is

a large requirement for air support, and in some cases naval support. The basic force for the conduct of counter-insurgency is an infantry force, in this age of specialization and equipment overloading, it is often called a light infantry force. This force requires the add on modules of specialization as in any other type of task force.

The training of a force suitable for the conduct of counter-insurgency will be addressed as part of a later chapter on the training of forces for LIC in general. It is worth reflecting that the allied forces in Vietnam were not militarily defeated in the field in either LIC, guerrilla warfare or limited war. (23) Whatever military setbacks were suffered were not due to the nature of the war but due to the same factors and level of competence that would have affected performance in a higher level of war, perhaps more so and with worse consequences.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER LIC

AID-TO-THE-CIVIL-POWER

Aid-to-the-Civil-Power (1) are those operations that an army performs to assist the civil police maintain law and order. It is an operation by the state's defence force and normally precedes a declaration of defence emergency in which increased power may be given to the military. Aid-to-the-Civil-Power is normally conducted under the auspices of domestic law. However, the extent of the military power and responsibility will also be determined by any special laws or legislation pertaining to the particular situation at hand. These operations are conducted in accordance with the principle of "primacy of the civil power", and support police operations. They include such support as:

- * the provision of equipment and logistics,
- * explosive ordinance disposal,
- * crowd and riot control, and
- * counter-terrorism operations. (2)

The laws and constitution of the state govern how a problem of internal security is classified and handled. It is necessary for allies in support of the internal security of a foreign state to understand, before a crisis, that state's laws and their impact on operations, before a crisis.

In some countries, Aid-to-the-Civil-Power operations may be termed "Security Force Operations" and effected by paramilitary forces. It should be noted that not all

countries that may require Western aid in LIC contain a separate military and police force. Where the police force is a sub-entity of the military then security force operations may be considered the normal role of the military. In this case it will be difficult to achieve responsive actions to the government unless the military has instituted some decentralized responsibility to each level of civil government, i.e. the military functions more like a civil police force than an army. However, in some of the Third World states likely to require foreign assistance, not only is the police controlled by the military but the government may be controlled directly or indirectly by the military. This is generally a root cause or aggravation of the problem within itself. The close inter-relationship of the civil police and military in domestic security may cause complications for a supporting power such as the USA, where the military is removed from this function by law. (3)

It is not inconceivable that a government may choose to defeat an insurgency in its infancy with an Aid-to-the-Civil-Power operation rather than a declaration of defence emergency and the publicizing of counter-insurgency operations. Aid-to-the-Civil-Power plays down the threat and stresses that the military is acting in support of the police, under the control of the civil government, and in accordance with the normal laws of the land. In democratic states all war is conducted under the primacy of civil power. In a crisis situation more of that civil power may be

passed temporarily to War Councils or regional military commanders so that all resources, both civil and military, can be mobilized in a co-ordinated plan. In the extremes of counter-insurgency or security force operations, martial law may be declared in various regions. A state facing the final phase of insurgency may be forced to declare martial law as a condition to all out war. The laws and constitution of democratic states generally cater for a "state of emergency" rather than martial rule. When faced with insurgency, the imposition of martial rule implies that the government is unable to govern and that the political status quo is no longer legitimate.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENCE

Foreign Internal Defence is a US term (4) that covers those assistance programmes that are designed to strengthen the defence of a friendly foreign country by enhancing defence capabilities to meet likely threats. It is an extension of foreign policy in the pursuit of national interests and is integrated with other programmes, such as those that provide developmental and economic assistance to promote stable nation building. All Western states possess such programmes. They are based on a belief that the interest of the West is entwined with the need for world stability and peace, national self determination, freedom and democracy, free trade, and the defeat of those who would enforce opposing ideals. (5) The programmes of Foreign Internal Defence are generally executed during peace but may

include elements conducted to prevent or conduct LIC: (6)

Security assistance is through the provision of military:

- o training,
- o equipment funding,
- o equipment,
- o advisers,
- o intelligence,
- o combat forces,
- o non-combat support,
- o special operations forces,
- o peacekeeping forces, and
- o economic aid to redress social and economic problems

The conduct of LIC within this category of foreign policy is as for the type of conflict, e.g.

counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, or peacekeeping.

TERRORISM AND TERRORISM COUNTER-ACTION

Terrorism.

Terrorism is a tactic of employing or threatening violence to achieve goals and is utilized within all levels of conflict from a state of peaceful competition to general war. It may achieve a goal directly, such as gaining the release of political prisoners, or support the achievement of goals indirectly, such as creating an environment of fear in which the release of political prisoners can be negotiated. It has more impact in an environment that is relatively peaceful and so it is an important feature of the LIC

environment. It may be employed by states and sub-national groups that do not have the resources or opportunity to pursue political, social or economic goals by other means. It may be employed as a low cost, low risk weapon in support of either specific or general goals. (7) Terrorism alone cannot effect change or overthrow the status quo unless the state which is the focus of the terrorism is prepared to react as the terrorist proposes. However, it is a two-sided weapon that may be detrimental to a cause. The motives for terrorism are many and varied, and at times it may be difficult to determine both the perpetrator and the motive. However, terrorist objectives fall into five categories: (8)

- * recognition,
- * coercion,
- * provocation,
- * intimidation, and
- * insurgency support.

The terrorist techniques are well known and only limited by imagination and resources. A new dimension will be given to terrorism if high-technology and nuclear and biological weapons are added to the stock techniques. At present these techniques include:

- * bombings,
- * assassination,
- * kidnapping,
- * hijacking or hostage barricades,
- * covert operations concealed as the normal pattern

of domestic crime or unreported operations.

Terrorism is normally treated as a criminal activity (9) by subject states, despite its origin and motive. The complication to this perspective is that terrorism is increasingly a tool of individuals, sub-national groups and external states that sponsor both individuals and sub-national groups in terrorism. How to deal with those who carry out terrorism is straight forward in theory but difficult to in practice. But how to deal with those behind terrorism is a problem of appropriate response and delivery, which may range from diplomatic and economic sanctions to covert operations abroad or a declaration of war.

The West is particularly vulnerable to terrorism due to the internal freedom of action afforded by its society and the complexity of that society. There is freedom of movement between such countries and often the ability to legally acquire the tools of terrorism. The profile of the terrorist organization is that of a secret society in which unity of purpose and the maintenance of security is paramount. External support is generally filtered to avoid a direct link to the source and a compromise of security. It is a covert organization much like a spy ring.

The West does not doctrinally sponsor terrorism although its enemies may argue otherwise. What is considered terrorism and what is considered a legitimate tactic is a matter of perception. The adage "one man's terrorist is another man's hero" is especially true.

Terrorism Counter-Action.

Terrorism is fought with the same approach as insurgency: with a cohesive and co-ordinated policy that mobilizes a spectrum of resources with the following intention:

- * prevent an environment conducive to terrorism
- * prevention by early identification and pre-emptive action;
- * possession of effective defence and security against terrorism; and
- * possession of a competent and appropriate response to terrorism.

The sustained acquisition of timely intelligence is vital in both counter-insurgency and terrorism counter-action. Specialist military action will be undertaken in conjunction with, or in support of, other government agencies to implement these measures. The role of the military, in general, will be to appreciate the threat and undertake appropriate security measures. An appropriate and competent response requires that the military be able to undertake the normal range of tactical operations with equal professionalism as that required in war. Such responses could range from the provision of a cordon, to a pre-emptive raid on foreign soil, to an attack on a fortified building. Quite often the military or police response will require the surgical application of violence in close proximity to non-combatants. In order to reduce casualties to the non-

combatants, this type of counter-terrorist operation requires the highly developed natural abilities and skills fostered in a specialized organization. However, there is only a requirement for a small such organization. It is a tendency of armies to develop elite units at the expense of raising the average proficiency of conventional forces as this appears to be an easier solution to needs. Such elitism can be divisive and destroy the cohesion of the team effort, not to mention removing the flexibility of the force as a whole. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING.

Peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping is a misnomer for that collection of operations undertaken to promote peace as an extension of a state of truce. It provides a catalyst for the continuation of such "peace" in the hope that the conflict can be resolved during this time by peaceful means. It is a prelude to a permanent peace or the resumption of hostilities. The operation of peacekeeping is dependent upon the creation of a situation in which the resumption of hostilities would involve a diplomatic or political loss for the combatants. It is either a self-imposed condition or a result of the external influence of other states, particularly the super-powers. Peacekeeping does not enforce peace, for it relies on moral suasion and mutually perceived interest. It is not analogous to a police operation, and the imposition of peace by force is peacemaking.

Peacekeeping is a militarily unsound operation in that

force is circumscribed to self-defence and the peacekeeping force is normally out-gunned by the antagonists. Peacekeeping should not be undertaken lightly. Western armies are not founded on the ideal of martyrdom. Gaining a proficiency in peacekeeping may debilitate the war fighting ethos and skills of the participants unless they are frequently engaged in skirmishes, in which case the operation is hardly successful. The combat virtues of aggression, offensive action, initiative, and maximizing violence are discouraged in a peacekeeping force. Yet while it is a risky operation it is certainly less so than an involvement in any war that might occur for want of a peacekeeping effort.

There should be at least four preconditions to the implementation of a peacekeeping mission: (10)

- * The parties in conflict must consent to the operation, the presence and composition of the force, and the terms of the mandate. They must support the operation and give it unqualified cooperation.

- * The operation must have substantial support of the international community, and in particular the two super-powers. It is preferable that the United Nations support the operation, but at a minimum the US must it.

- * The operation must have a clear, defined and realistic mandate.

- * The force must be allowed the freedom of movement to execute the mandate and supervise the conditions of the peace agreement.

A further expression of these principles is contained in the US doctrine for involvement in peacekeeping, which requires: (11)

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| * consent | * neutrality |
| * balance | * single chain of command |
| * concurrent action | * unqualified sponsor support |
| * force integrity | * freedom of movement |
| * self-defence | |

The US doctrine is somewhat idealistic and reflects experiences gained in Multinational Force I (August to September 1982, Beirut) and Multinational Force II (September 1982 to February 1984, Beirut). (12) Unfortunately, often peacekeeping is formulated in a crisis situation in which all these preconditions will not exist. One could argue that if the antagonists could agree to the creation of such a farce then the ideal conditions of peacekeeping might arise; however, real world politics and issues do not support such an idealistic view. Even the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), with its poor conception and record of achievement, has helped in reducing the violence in Southern Lebanon to a lower level than if it had not been instituted. (13)

Despite the problems of U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations, (14) given the equal precondition of the four factors they are preferable to non-U.N. sponsored operations. It is arguable that the principle of neutrality and balance should dictate that organizations such as the United Nations

Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), (15) consist of integrated teams of both US and USSR members rather than the current segregation. Under these conditions, less problems and a speedier resolution might have been possible in areas such as South Lebanon and Beirut.

It is important to realize that the failure of the MNF II was in the posturing of that operation as peacekeeping without the necessary pre-conditions. Certainly the force could not be viewed as neutral by all of the combatants in the theatre as it was directed to support one of the antagonists, the Lebanese Armed Forces. Despite the best of intentions, the mandate was akin to foreign internal defence assistance rather than peacekeeping. The Lebanese problem was, and still is, complex, and required more than a "show of gunboats".

Operational Methods.

The operational methods of peacekeeping are limited. They are similar to those applicable to border defence, but generally do not allow any offensive action. It is unacceptable, however, for a peacekeeping force to be placed in a position where its soldiers are unable to adequately protect themselves from kidnap and murder. Like all soldiering, peacekeeping requires a high standard of individual training in the military fundamentals, a proficiency in small unit tactics, and self-discipline. It requires responsive management in the form of operational

art. Examples of basic methods are:

- * key point defence,
- * patrolling,
- * observation, reconnaissance, and surveillance,
- * information gathering,
- * mine clearing,
- * movement control, and
- * police, humanitarian and mediator duties.

Training. (16)

Peacekeeping tasks can be executed by conventionally trained and mature soldiers after supplementary instruction on the mission and peculiarities of the theatre. In the absence of war, peacekeeping duties may provide the stimulus and experiences associated with proximity to combat. It can reinforce basic lessons of soldiering but it can be a debilitating experience over a prolonged period of inactivity as it does not require the full range of offensive skills and tactics. It reduces the aggressive spirit, the initiative, and consequently the morale of troops.

Headquarters and leaders are concerned more with the management of their units rather than the command and manoeuvre of tactical forces. It may impart a sense of invincibility and lethargy as personnel come to view the threat with detachment. All these factors prove lethal in combat.

Peacemaking.

Peacemaking is an operation in which law and order

within a state, or peace between warring states, is enforced largely by military force or the threat of military force. It can be either the prelude to peacekeeping operations or a consequence of failed peacekeeping operations. It may be undertaken as a result of insurgency or civil war and is generally formulated and implanted in the environment of a crisis. As the objective of peacemaking is to enforce a state of peace, then it may require a significant force and level of violence to disengage the antagonists or to disarm the lawless. It is unlikely that a peacemaking force will be perceived as neutral, as one or more of the antagonists are likely to receive an advantage or benefit from the operation over other antagonists who will perceive this advantage. A peacemaking operation should avoid aggravating the causes of the conflict if possible.

Peacemaking is most commonly imposed when the continuation of the conflict threatens international stability or for humanitarian reasons. Peacemaking should not be confused with foreign intervention in an environment of insurgency or civil war, in which the intervening power is aiding or opposing a government. A peacemaking operation is theoretically neutral.

It will be difficult for a peacekeeping force to evolve from a peacemaking role since the use of force in the latter function involves it as a player or antagonist in the conflict. It is equally difficult for a peacekeeping force to be employed as a peacemaking force if it has been

structured for peacekeeping, as it will normally be without sufficient combat power.

Peacemaking is undertaken in conjunction with actions in other dimensions, such as diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. However, despite the desirability of using minimal violence, the peacemaking force must have sufficient combat power available to achieve its mission. It is better to coerce the antagonists with the threat of force rather than action, but the threat must be creditable and backed by will. Peacemaking enforced with minimal violence generally has a better prospect of developing into a lasting peace.

Training.

There is nothing peculiar to peacemaking that is not peculiar to war in general and counter-insurgency, security force, or peacekeeping, in particular. It is a difficult and delicate operation requiring considerable maturity and a sound appreciation of the environment.

PEACETIME CONTINGENCIES

General.

The US Army definition of these operations is:

Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war." (17)

Contingency operations consist of:

- * strike and raid,
- * rescue,
- * demonstrations and show of force,

- * peacemaking,
- * unconventional warfare,
- * intelligence operations.

Such operations may be effected during higher levels of conflict and may precipitate war unless some other inhibiting factor is present, such as diplomacy or the inability of the target state or group to adequately respond. As such these operations must be accompanied by initiatives in other dimensions. Clearly, the military power that is relatively more powerful possesses a greater number of contingency options, although some of these may be circumscribed by other factors, such as the risk of escalating the conflict.

Generally these operations are implemented in a situation when the time is short and the objective valuable. The exact circumstances of the threat may not have been foreseen, but a general contingency plan for such a situation should have been formulated during peace. For this reason, most Western armies maintain forces for rapid deployment, consisting of air and seaborne forces, including special action forces or commandoes. By virtue of the variety of tasks and the need for precision these forces must be well trained and flexible.

Insurgency and counter-insurgency have hitherto dominated the West's interest at the low end of the conflict spectrum. The proliferation of terrorism, peacekeeping missions and international skirmishes illustrates the likelihood of Western forces being involved with little warning and the need for proficiency in these types of LIC.

CHAPTER SIX

GUIDING PHILOSOPHY AND STRATEGY

NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The first necessity for the successful prosecution of LIC is an appropriate national philosophy on the prosecution of conflict as a whole. Such a philosophy should reflect the values of the state and the Western community in general and provide a common understanding by which a unity of purpose may be engendered within a state and among states. The nature of democracy and of state sovereignty make this a difficult task, but one that must be addressed by each nation of the Western alliance individually and collectively. The USSR, and other totalitarian states and ideologically based movements outside the state system, likely to challenge the West, are less impeded in formulating a cohesive approach to conflict.

The West lives in the hope that mankind can achieve a state of natural peace and harmony. Western democracy fosters that hope and generally now tries to adhere to peace. Such idealism is enunciated in our constitutions and national strategies. However, an idealistic hope should not blind us to reality. Reality is that men and states have competing interests which they have been hitherto reluctant to surrender for a state of peace. Conflict is likely to be a permanent feature of relationships among men and between states. The democratic state and its citizens are cognizant of this reality in everyday life, and the competing interests of men are institutionalized to as low a level of conflict as

possible. What the democratic population does not universally understand is that conflict is a continuum entwined with all facets of life and that it requires a cohesive management along its entire length and breadth. The democratic population does not understand that the penalty of democracy is that the citizen has a role in that management over and above his responsibility to his immediate neighbour. Democratic states face a danger as they become increasingly complex and attempt to be democratically responsive: the people will get exactly what they want. And in a complex society, what they want may be based on ignorance and hope rather than reality. If a state were to become truly democratic, then each citizen might try to influence influence each decision of state. It is arguable whether the majority has the wisdom to govern in such circumstances.

It is the role of the government, no matter what the party, to try and educate the citizenry with the same realization that every Politician, diplomat and professional soldier should already Possess regarding the prosecution of conflict:

- * A level of conflict, not harmony, is at present the natural state of affairs.

- * Conflict does not disappear by its own accord, but is managed by men.

- * Conflict is not Just a state of war but a pervasive continuum of violence levels that is also waged during relative peace.

- * The inter-relationship of sovereign states is not analogous with domestic conditions or personal morality.

* A vital deduction from the hope of peace and the reality of conflict is the need to keep conflict at the lowest possible level. This is only possible by an effective counter that negates the viability of violence in the pursuit of survival and interest, and replaces it with an alternative. In the international sense, the perfect alternative has yet to be found, but the viability of violence is reduced, if not removed, by a balance of power.

* The dimensions of politics, society, and economics etc. have always been entwined with conflict and force. The increasing complexity of the world and inter-relationships, coupled with an access to infinite force, makes it almost impossible to isolate and deal with aspects of life in a microcosm. This is true of LIC.

* The West possesses some inherent vulnerabilities to LIC and in the management of conflict in general.

* The management of conflict in the future must be total in approach to be successful. It must address all conflict levels, their inter-relationship, and their development throughout time.

* A total management-approach requires the type of stability and consistency of government achieved by some totalitarian states or by responsible democracy. It is unlikely to be achieved by those who advocate laissez-faire or anarchy.

* Responsible democracy requires governmental leadership and institutions that ensure the public are educated with fact rather than manipulated. It requires a competent government with a mandate to govern.

* Every element of a democratic society-has a role in the management of conflict, not just the politicians, the military or police. This is a vital understanding for the prosecution of LIC.

* The maintenance of security requires a will and commitment to fight and sacrifice.

The purpose and need for a philosophy in conflict management is well articulated by the following US statement on the conduct of LIC:

The foundation for a successful US effort in LIC lies in the simple principle of unity of effort. The cardinal lesson of counter-insurgency and insurgency is that the disparate elements that compose the effort must contribute to a common purpose, and there must be a clear, consistent guidance and focus on the ultimate objective. This requires an articulated philosophy or set of principles: a policy that turns principles into operational goals, and a set of means available to translate intentions into effort. Moreover, a system is required to continually review the effort in relation to goals. A capacity to adjust to changing circumstances, a commitment to understanding the true nature of the effort and a sustained approach to the problem are also necessary. (1)

The final reality that national Philosophy and the public must recognize, is the inability of a state to construct a risk free security strategy within finite resources. The difference between the optimum security strategy and the strategy that the state can afford or is

prepared to finance, is the level of risk. Many Western countries are living beyond the means of their productivity, and increasingly, defence expenditure is under scrutiny to reduce costs. This is an attractive logic in a "seemingly" benign and peaceful environment. It is attractive if the Soviet Union proffers a peaceful hand. It is attractive, if in the foreseeable future, conflicts are likely to be less devastating and threatening and conducted in a LIC environment. It is attractive to over-cater for the low end of the-conflict spectrum in the belief that time and motivation will allow a rapid and adequate defence expansion when and if a "real", war emerges. This is a fundamental flaw of logic; to over-cater for the LIC environment results in a "police force", not an army, and does not provide military competence in any level of conflict, including LIC. The initiation and escalation of future conflict is likely to preclude adequate warning.

Beware the West!

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

If the proposition of this paper, and that of more distinguished men such as the US commission on Discriminate Deterrence, (2) is accepted then the national approach to LIC should not be in isolation but integrated into the national strategy for conflict management as a whole. National security requires an effective counter to a spectrum of threats that may be employed "individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously." (3) A

balance of power must be maintained along the entire conflict spectrum.

Contingency planning should look at each possible scenario of LIC, each region in which LIC may embroil the nation, and the relationship of these scenarios to other conflict levels and type. Hopefully, this process is already undertaken within Western state and defence departments for all possible conflict scenarios. What must be ensured is that the planning and conduct of LIC, like war itself, is not just a function of the military or state department. It requires a strategy that has access to all state resources. Where the military has a role in LIC within the state, then the strategy should cover the co-operative efforts of all internal agencies, especially the police. This is important where criminal activities such as terrorism and drug trafficking pose a significant threat to law and order. An integrated and comprehensive strategy will require a lateral co-ordination of these resources at each level of initiative to ensure cohesion from theory to practice and all elements working in concert.

An integrated strategy means correctly identifying commonalities and differences within the threat scenarios and adjusting forces and training accordingly. This adjustment is the simple answer to ensuring that a Western state can conduct LIC without denigrating its defence capabilities elsewhere. Like all good strategies it should have the following characteristics:

- * Consistent-with national philosophy and goals.
- * Comprehensive-includes all aspects and resources.
- * Integrated-with other strategies such as foreign policy and economic strategy, and can be co-ordinated in effect. It promotes commonality of efforts and caters for differences.
- * Enduring-it caters for the long term as well as tomorrow. It is based on vision.
- * Flexible-review is inherent and initiative is allowed to achieve goals, which themselves may be reviewed.
- * Cohesive-logically formulated.
- * Realistic-it is achievable.

The main areas of disconnect in Western nations in the chain of translating philosophy to strategy to action are;

- * a fundamental national disunity of philosophy,
- * government and people;
- * a lack of capacity within government agencies to formulate or execute an integrated strategy; and
- * incompetence and corruption.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

Strategy.

The military strategy is a continuation of security strategy and complementary to other state strategies such as economic policy. The principle difference between the military strategy for tic and that for higher level conflict is that the resolution by force is not normally the decisive

element. The military must be cognizant of the other aspects of the conflict to a greater degree than would be the case in modern conventional wars. The current perception of separate civil and military functions within a state of warfare has not always been the norm. In 1940 the USMC Small Wars Manual contained as much guidance on the running of a state as on military strategy and tactics.(4) The US Marines had learnt from bitter experience in the Carribean that success in "small wars" required tee co-ordination of both civil and military affairs under one leadership and strategy. In LIC today, the military is used as much for its organizational aspects and its efficiency in action as for its ability to deliver violence. (5) However, the military's ability to deliver violence is the very factor that may inhibit the violence of the conflict. This ability should never be surrendered or taken for granted.

LIC is conducted primarily on land, but it generally requires a significant amount of strategic and tactical, air and naval support. In the case of strike missions this support may be akin to the air and sea battle to be found in conventional war. However, the maintenance of sea and air Power must be based on a higher threat level than LIC, as well as supporting LIC. The maintenance of sea and air power inhibits the lines of communication by which LIC could other wise be freely exported and Supported throughout the world.

The LIC spectrum is a range of conflicts that each contains situations to be found in war. The doctrine and

strategy for the conduct of LIC was reviewed in Chapters Four and Five. The doctrine is well developed and theoretically sound. The basic military skills and tactics for LIC are the same as those for any conflict, and its commonality with the tactics for war-fighting has been stressed and its differences highlighted. This is not a revelation to the experienced soldier, but it may not be so self-evident in a "peacetime army". (6) If the doctrine of LIC has a weakness, then it may be, that one could be lead to believe from the detailed analysis in some writings that LIC is a "special" form of warfare. A warfare that can only be waged by special troops, tactics and organizations.

It is emphasized that LIC is a manoeuvre warfare philosophy rather than attrition philosophy. If the philosophy of an army is tied to a quantitative approach, then the LIC environment may be seen as particularly special.

The second weakness of the current LIC doctrine is that it may template by over-analysis the strategy and tactics to be employed in a given situation. This is a condition equally disastrous in preparing for war, when to reduce reaction time a situation is fitted into one of our contingency plans and as a consequence the vital differences are missed. This is a difficult problem to overcome in prolonged peace. As battlefield experience declines we try to preserve it in detailed writings. It must be remembered that the experience is now historical and can only provide a guide for the next conflict. Experienced is an advantage but not a guarantee of

future performance, particularly in war.

One of the greatest advantages a strategy or doctrine can possess is its implementation by competent thinkers. It is currently fashionable to term this ability as operational art, but it is the matrix by which a goal is carried from strategy to bayonet. It is called the military appreciation, the estimate of the situation, or problem solving. It is in this process of logical thinking that all who make decisions must be competent. It is not stressed in the LIC doctrine, but vital in all conflict and especially so in LIC, where the situation is likely to be less stereotyped and often complex. Specialization and drills may increase efficiency but often at the expense of flexibility.

Military doctrine in general must ensure that the commonality of force structure, strategy and tactics across the conflict spectrum is stressed and maximizes the advantage that this commonality provides. The doctrine should address LIC problems wherever possible within the framework of fundamental organizations and tactics. The doctrine must also cater for areas of the conflict that are fundamentally different in techniques and must address the application of new technology.

The West cannot afford a LIC army or a "peacetime army". The philosophy, forces, strategy and tactics of a Western army should be applicable across the conflict spectrum, from "peaceful competition" to war.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FORCE STRUCTURE

GENERAL

Each nation must structure a force in accordance with its circumstances. It is therefore difficult to provide a universal model of a force for LIC. Therefore, the force models in Figures 2 and 3 represent an over-all conceptual basis in which forces suitable for the conduct of LIC are integrated into a larger army in accordance with the deduced strategy. The models have been designed to accommodate the strategic needs of a nation across a spectrum of conflicts and regions. They have been constructed within the framework of tactics utilized in both LIC and higher conflict. The tactical needs of LIC have been compared in Figure 4 with the basic requirements of higher level conflict to illustrate commonalities and differences.

NATIONAL AND STRATEGIC

The force structure has been modelled on strategic needs by region, including a home region as the most important. It is appreciated that not all Western powers have the need or ability to project power beyond their region unless working in concert with an ally. Therefore, the extent of the threat and the extent of regional forces may be considerably less for some countries than the model portrays.

Each region is considered to consist of three mediums in which conflict may occur or threaten to occur throughout the conflict spectrum.

Figure 4

COMPARISON OF TACTICAL REQUIREMENTSLIC TO CONVENTIONAL

REQUIREMENT	AID-TO-THE COUNTER- -CIVIL-POWER TERRORISM	PEACEKEEPING COUNTER- INSURGENCY OPERATIONS	CONTINGENCY MECH	CONVENTIONAL INF
<u>INDIVIDUAL</u>				
Mental fit, incl discipline and mil org.	HIGH			
Physical fitness.	HIGH			
Skill, incl marksmanship with personal sub-unit and crew weapons, fieldcraft, operate sub-unit equip, first aid etc.	HIGH			
Teamanship	HIGH			
<u>SUB-UNIT</u>				
Infantry minor tactics (platoon),				
offense	HIGH			
defence	HIGH			
mech	LOW			
construct field defences	HIGH	PERIODIC	P	HIGH P-H
patrol, incl fighting and recon	HIGH			
<u>UNIT</u> (for discussion battalion and company)				
Tactics				
offence	HIGH			
defence	HIGH			
mobile/mech/tank	LOW			
Employ supporting arms	PERIODIC	PERIODIC	P	HIGH P-H
services	PERIODIC	HIGH		
artillery fire support	LOW	HIGH		
tank	LOW	HIGH		
close air	LOW	PERIODIC		HIGH P-H
deep air	LOW	PERIODIC		HIGH
naval gunfire	LOW		PERIODIC	HIGH
Cordon and search	HIGH		PERIODIC	HIGH
Civil control	HIGH			
Movement control	HIGH			
Night operations	HIGH			
Raid	HIGH			
Amphibious	LOW			
Airborne	LOW	PERIODIC	HIGH	
Airmobile (helo)	PERIODIC	PERIODIC	HIGH	
Vehicle	HIGH	HIGH		
Mechanized/tank	LOW/NEVER	LOW		
Engineer	HIGH			HIGH P-H
Intelligence	HIGH			
Logistics	HIGH			
Communications/Electronic Warfare	HIGH			
Naval to naval	LOW/NEVER	LOW		
Air to air	LOW/NEVER		PERIODIC	HIGH
Anti-air	LOW/NEVER		PERIODIC	HIGH
Special operations	HIGH	LOW	PERIODIC	HIGH
Chemical	LOW/NEVER			
Nuclear	NEVER	LOW NEVER	LOW NEVER	P-H IN G. WAR

The force is task organized by threat in each medium and region. In a region of high level threat then the force will be conventional and possibly nuclear based on the likely enemy and the nature of the environment. If a LIC is likely then the task force will be an infantry oriented group rather than a mechanized force. A mix of capabilities can be structured to counter a mix of likely threats in the one region. A force Postured for a higher level is capable of conducting LIC. However, the heavier fire power assets will be of less use than personnel acting as infantry. On the other hand, an infantry force employed in LIC will need additional fire power if the conflict escalates to conventional war.

The conduct of the air and sea battle should be considered on a global basis as well as region by region. A defence department must also contain the organization capable of conducting a multi-regional or global conflict. Due to the many state resources required to prosecute LIC outside the legislation of "war", a LIC/Special Operations Command may have to be established within the defence department, as in the USA (1), and a like office within the department of foreign affairs and state. A war or security council commands both and should dictate who is in command of an operation, but until the military effort over-rides all other considerations then the department of foreign affairs should command. In the latter case, all other departments, including the defence department, are in direct support of

the department of foreign affairs. In most cases the military aspects of LIC operations in support of countries within a region will be commanded by the regional commander and not directly by the LIC/SO Command or anyone else. The principle of a single chain-of-command is still relevant at this level.

The LIC/SO Command responsibilities should include the following: to co-ordinate LIC/SO missions on command for SAF actions with global rather than regional significance, to provide Special Operations and Special Action Forces in support of regional and contingency forces, to be responsible for SAF training and doctrine, and to liaise with other forces involved in LIC duties.

Contingency forces and reserves form the basis of adding or subtracting to the regional task force and are constructed on a basis of two overlapping forces: one predominantly mechanized and the other predominantly infantry. A module of heavy support that could be required by either is maintained as an add-on element and consists of additional armour, vehicles, aircraft, and artillery, etc. The contingency force must contain sufficient aircraft to allow a component of each type of task force to be airmobile, with a follow on contingency force by air or sea lift. In the event of a contingency required to force an entry into a region, then the overall force should also contain an amphibious capability.

The basis of the land army is infantry. To this may be added of nuclear forces, tanks, and mechanized forces, if the

predominant and global needs dictate a larger core force. Even so, the first commonality is infantry training. The air and naval forces are based predominantly on a high level threat and the need win any air or sea battle in order to support the land forces. This basis does not preclude the vital need to concurrently support the core land force in all levels of conflict, nor the need to deploy and support contingency forces to the battlefield.

The overall force consists of a regular component and a reserve component which may be partially activated for operational service at the onset of LIC, if required. The reserve should concentrate on maintaining high technical skills in areas in which an expertise can be better maintained in peacetime, e.g. engineering, medicine, etc. Some of these personnel should be available to undertake their commitments during LIC without the necessity of large scale mobilization, e.g. CA and medical personnel.

The internal security function of the military should acknowledge the possibility of conflict being conducted on home soil and provide for the integration of police forces, civil emergency agencies and the defence force in time of Aid-to-the-Civil-Power or defence emergency. Reserve forces should contain the substantial outline of a "home guard" with peacetime operational duties. The meaningful employment of the citizen-soldier is a healthy practice within a democracy.


TACTICAL

As Previously stated, LIC is primarily conducted on the

medium of land, although the current provision of US and Western naval escorts in the Persian Gulf illustrates a sea and air LIC. The tactical model for LIC is simply a task force made up of otherwise conventional forces. On land the basis is an infantry unit of an appropriate size, with its integrated organization and reinforced within the principle of task grouping. In most cases this grouping consists of an all arms and combined service representation. The table at Figure 4 provides a comparison of tactical requirements for a LIC force with those for a conventional force.

The infantry basis need not be referred to as light infantry, or conventional infantry as that term has come to mean infantry with or without other forms of mobility and firepower. Mechanized infantry may conduct LIC tasks with its vehicles, such as convoy escort and key point security, or alight and act as what they are first and foremost, infantry. The basic tactical principles of land fighting are represented in all armies by infantry. All soldiers must acquire these basic war-fighting skills as infantry before branching into additional weaponry and methods of fighting. Training for conventional war is the basis for LIC. (2) The organization, skills and tactics may be adapted as required.

As a principle, all forces must be logistically supportable to achieve their mission in an economic fashion. While forces must be capable of operating with a minimal of logistic support in many of the LIC scenarios, this is not to say that forces for LIC must eschew anything but that which



they can carry on their back. Soldiers must fight in any conflict as physically unimpaired as possible, i.e. equipped as lightly as required to be effective and survive on the battlefield. The logistical problem is to help this happen by

[UNABLE TO READ ORIGINAL TEXT] and still

provide him with the equipment and supplies he needs without denigrating his tactical ability. In some cases LIC forces must be self-sufficient and in others they will require as significant logistical support as a conventional force.

The forces that must be structured, trained and maintained in addition to those elements common to LIC are listed in Figure 4. They include mechanized formations, nuclear forces, forces for air and sea battles, and

associated groupings of combat support, such as heavy artillery and air defence, and logistics support. These forces are maintained according to the threat and may be brigaded in some cases or placed as an add-on module to a basic infantry force or kept in the reserves for activation in time of escalation. Whatever, all troops must rotate through combined arms training in at least mid-intensity conflict with the full inventory of weapons, corps, and service. Especially those involved in LIC. Such rotation can be interspersed with primary missions but adds flexibility and experience to the army.

Forces should be structured as complete tactical entities with a full complement of men and material rather than skeleton units designed to be fleshed out at the time of requirement. This is true for LIC and conventional forces. Only complete forces can train as such and develop all their capabilities to maximize usefulness. Skeleton forces are a means of maintaining equipment and facilities but not expertise. It is better to clone two new units by the division of one healthy unit, than to build up two mediocre units. A nation that elects the concept of maintaining a cadre army for wartime expansion requires units for immediate fighting and units for cloning.

A very important element of the LIC task force is the Special Action Forces attachments as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. These units contain the reservoir of additional capabilities required in LIC and other warfare in which it is impractical to train all units. However, the danger of over-

specialization and empire-building must be avoided. Where ever possible the existing organizations and capabilities of state and defence should be employed for simplicity. At least the defence organization should be inherently flexible while retaining professionalism.

Whatever the force structure, it must flow from a consideration of national philosophy and strategy, resources, the enemy and threat, and a thorough knowledge of what is militarily sound and achievable. Once established, the structure should be allowed to develop efficiency without the turmoil of continual re-organization. The organization's aim is to dispense controlled violence when and where necessary.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PREPARATION AND TRAINING

GENERAL

Even with the appropriate strategy and force structure, the West may not win in LIC, or at any other level of conflict unless it can translate the strategy and forces into competent action. The translation is achieved by preparation and training of all players, military and civilian alike, before, during and after the actual conflict. It is a never ending process. The preparation and training for war is the basis for the preparation and training for LIC, and so this chapter does not address every aspect of military training. It focuses on critical areas which the West must address. Some of these areas have been neglected or forgotten in war preparation, while others need reinterpretation in a changing world.

HIGHER COMMAND

It should be a valid assumption that those personnel who have reached the upper echelons of command possess the professional ability, experience, personal character and philosophy necessary to formulate the type of military strategy depicted in Chapter 6. The personnel and organization of the higher command must be trained as the nexus between the civilian leadership and the military strategy. If the military command is unable to bridge this gap, or unable to appreciate the non-military factors of a conflict, then the military strategy is likely to be flawed

from the start. The higher command must realistically know the difference between what is theoretically desireable and tactically achieveable. In LIC it will be necessary to keep the political leadership well informed on what can, and cannot be achieved militarily, and within what level of risk.

The selection and training of the higher command must stress competence, integrity, flexibility, and team effort. The command must be able to appreciate a multitude of dimensions and yet prune away the confusion to the core of logic. It must be able to relate past operational art to the reality of the field and tactics of today, as well as appreciate the broader considerations of the state's position. In this regard it may be necessary for politicians, public servants and the military to broaden their education. If politicians cannot be expected to understand the practical ramifications of their policies, then they must be truthfully advised by the military and the civil administration. This integrity and loyalty cannot be swept aside by the need for a team effort. Only fact can serve a Western democracy.

It will be necessary to maintain a vitality of intellect that is able to transcend the various levels of command and levels of conflict, from peace to war, to keep track of what is important in each era and what must be done to prepare for that which will be important in the next era. Western democracies do not automatically foster the same characteristics during both peace and war, and so this flexibility must be actively encouraged. The "peacetime

mentality" must be bannished from the army and replaced with an appreciation of the present as the key to future.

The higher command must be efficient with sufficient latitude during peace to allow increased capacity during war. Often the training during peace is aimed at creating a command that is only efficient during peace. All command structures should be geared for war, with a peacetime increment that can be turned to wartime priorities. The business model can offer some expertise in the field of efficiency, but war is not analogous to business, for war cannot show a material or tangible profit, and neither can a peacetime army necessarily prove that its existence and efforts give a certain measure of security.

The higher command must be geared to leading, which includes managing, the army across the conflict spectrum. The leadership during peace will set the ground for success in conflict. LIC provides an indication of how well prepared the higher command, both civil and military, is for a higher level of war. If it performs unsatisfactorily at this level, then it is hardly likely to be competent at an increased pace. It is possible for the command to be competent across the entire spectrum from war to peace once if it is accepted that these extremes are inseparable and require the same approach.

OPERATIONAL ART

Training in the operational art for LIC is no different than for conflict in general. It requires the same

flexibility of mind to solve a problem in accordance with an appreciation of factors as does either tactics or strategy. It requires the ability to translate strategy into militarily achievable objectives. But it is not a pure game of logic because it requires the ability to configure an operation with both logic and imagination. This is a challenge for the formation commanders in LIC for there are many conflicting factors and few stereotyped solutions. The LIC doctrine is unlikely to be exactly applicable to the situation at hand.

Operational art requires the sound foundation of the logical military appreciation applied with a flexible mind. Organizations must be then geared to commanding a variety of force structures in diverse situations. Preparation must include the formulation of basic procedures across the army that standardizes the fundamental aspects of warfighting and allows for the rapid regrouping of forces as required, i.e. doctrine and standing operating procedures must be universally read, understood and used as the basis for training, and if irrelevant then changed. They should not be discarded due to ignorance of their contents..

Training should concentrate on the formulation and coordination of battle plans. The operational art is only refined by continual practice and experience of a broad range of situations that will test the ingenuity and thought process. This training must be coupled with a sound education and time for reflective thought. Intuition and luck play a part in operational art as much as in any other endeavour

but they are largely over-riden by logic and imagination, and should not form the basis of planning. The four primary training vehicles for developing the operational art are force deployments, Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs), command exercises, and wargaming with or without computer simulation. The Sound foundation for good operational art is in education.

TACTICAL

Tactical training for conflict is effected under unit and sub-unit integrity. The rule of thumb should be to train the smallest tactical team to a high standard first, and then move onto the next higher team. Providing that the coordinating headquarters is competent then such units can quickly become an effective task force; however, a task force of mediocre units is inherently flawed regardless of how long it practises together. Manoeuvre warfare and LIC requires that units achieve goals within the commander's intention. Units must be capable of independent action and initiative to see that the intention is effected regardless of changes to the situation. Well trained units are capable of such action and well suited for LIC. mediocre units may be massed to achieve objectives but are irrelevant in LIC and generally analogous with attrition warfare tactics. The battlefields of the future will require units that can carry on regardless of being isolated during periods of confusion and adverse fortune

LIC training must emphasize the role of small unit

tactics and the role of the junior leader and his team. Leaders must be trained to think in relevant detail when formulating plans and to assume command at two levels higher than their function if necessary. Personnel must be cross trained in the major equipment and weapons within their unit, even if this means informally. For land forces the units must be trained in the basic tactics of offense and defence up to and including battalion, regardless of arm or corps. To this training units should then add Specialized training in those additional tactics required in each theatre. This training may include air, amphibious and mechanized operations. In fact, most units will be required to be competent in at least two of these operations in order to move around the battlefield, whether conventional or LIC.

The process for preparing a unit for any conflict is similar to that for LIC:

- * an appreciation of the situation, including the rationale of the overall strategy, the enemy, the environment and the nature of allied forces and people;
- * a thorough understanding of the objective and what is to be achieved by the operation;
- * an understanding and thorough knowledge of the strategy, tactics and weapons to be employed, as well as any other resources such as specialist forces or non-military support;
- * additional skills and training, including acclimatization, required to execute the plan; and

* rehearsal and practice of the operation and associated skills and review.

The doctrine for the training of forces for LIC varies from that of conventional warfare only in the emphasis that conventional warfare places on concentrating violence against the enemy. Thus conventional warfare training is weighted towards larger weapons systems and the integration of a combined services effort in dispensing this violence. A LIC force must be trained in these procedures as well so that it does not surrender the option of escalated violence.

Units, like individuals, must be proficient in the basic tactics under all conditions. This training requires a degree of repetition that need not be boring providing it is applied with imagination. The lowest standard of expertise is that demonstrated under the clinical conditions often applied in training and exercises. A winning army must be able to do so under conditions that do not resemble a sporting game but war. Conditions in which units are exhausted and disadvantaged.

Often it is not the doctrine of LIC or any other operation that is inflexible, but the application of the doctrine with a lack of imagination. Units, both LIC and conventionally oriented, once they are proficient in the basic application of the doctrine should be trained by continual exposure to new problems. Problems conducted in situations as close to that of war as possible and that require innovative application of the team's strengths. In

the conduct of such training it will be necessary to introduce the stress of war and such elements as physical fear, exhaustion and confusion. This should be conducted in a graduated manner to temper the forces, not break them. Short term and indiscriminate "bastardization" of men and units is detrimental and does not add to unit cohesion. In order to obtain such tempering, then the process must be controlled and extensive: it will require less posting turbulence than is now generally experience within many Western armies. LIC, and combat in general, requires mature individuals with a depth of knowledge and experience who have worked and lived together as a team.

LIC exercises in peace should be conducted in an environment similar to that encountered in reality. Units should be exposed to working among the civil population of Third World countries on combined exercises. Real problems of civil affairs, resupply, and tactics will emerge and solved. In some cases solutions, such as real aid to the locals, will help to remove potential causes of LIC. Too often such exercises are conducted in an exercise area devoid of non-combatants and with artificial problems. It is also necessary to conduct Aid-to-the-Civil-Power exercises in the home environment, Just as natural disaster exercises.

Training must continue during a conflict to upgrade skills and to retain those skills that may be required in the future. In LIC there are a number of operations such as Peacekeeping that do not require all the tactical expertise

of a unit. Such units should continue training in these skills where possible and be rotated with other duties to avoid a debilitation of capabilities and to broaden the experience of the rest of the army.

The aim of LIC training is to build quality units from quality individuals so that, given any environment, equipment and conditions, they can out perform an enemy on a man-to-man and unit-to-unit basis. This is not to say that every man or unit will reach that standard, but it should be the rationale behind the training.

INDIVIDUAL

The training of the individual in warfighting is the foundation of an army. The basic skills do not differ whether required for peacekeeping duties or to act as mechanized infantry in Europe. The basis of specialist skills are also universal, as are those of the navy and air force. There will be a need to adapt and utilize these skills in different ways, but this is not difficult for the individual who is well trained in his field. Inflexibility is caused by those who are shallow and confined to a limited aspect of a weapon or piece of equipment.

There are four basic areas which warrant special mention as being individual training necessities for LIC, if not for all soldiering. They are;

- * Physical Fitness,
- * Mental Fitness,
- * Personal Skill, and

* Teamsmanship.

Physical Fitness. Only a Physically fit individual can hope to consistently out-perform the enemy under the physical and mental stress of war. Soldiers must be trained up to a high standard of physical fitness which includes endurance, toughness, agility and co-ordination. Again, they must be tempered rather than broken or debilitated. Physical fitness must be accompanied by the maintenance of good health throughout the soldier's entire life, for as he is required for less physical combat his experience and leadership must be maximized.

Physically fit and tough soldiers quickly adapt to new environments and to new situations. Physically toughening soldiers helps to build confidence which in turn can help to balance fear. The physical training must extend beyond the civilian type of activities to condition men for battle. All soldiers should participate in team sports, and robust team sports should be encouraged to develop not only physical fitness, but co-ordination, teamsmanship, and controlled aggression. Basic training must include route marching, unarmed combat, assault swimming, roping, obstacle courses and bayonet training. The latter should be taught not because it is the most likely need on the battlefield, but because it develops the willingness to close with and enemy and to destroy him. Even in the less violent environment of LIC this potential is the most important for the army.

Mental Fitness. There are many dimensions to mental

fitness, a great number of which are inherent or otherwise within the individual. But there are five aspects of a soldier's mental fitness which must be promoted and developed during training. They are; loyalty, self-discipline, aggression mental agility, and confidence.

A loyal soldier must feel a commitment to his comrades and to the army/organization in which he fights and to his country, regardless of his situation. This commitment is reinforced by an honest and competent military environment. Above all, a soldier must be loyal to the ideals for which he fights.

Self-discipline is based on an understanding and appreciation of the sacrifices that must be made as a soldier. Self-discipline comes with maturity and a sound military education based on explanation, not indoctrination. It is helped by fostering responsibility and the unemotional application of military discipline. A firm self-discipline is required in LIC when the individual must be able to apply discriminating violence and controlled aggression despite his fear.

Aggression must be nurtured into a controllable force that is normally applied with battlefield cunning but may be unleashed as an aggressive fury in a last resort. Aggression without a sense of survival is costly. Given the option of a glorious frontal attack or a sneaky envelopment, the soldier must prefer to kill the enemy without risk. There will be circumstances when the only choice will be to fight toe to

toe and then the soldier must do so with superior aggression. Mental agility is the ability to solve problems by logic and, where necessary, imagination. It is a characteristic that we require in leaders and followers. All soldiers must be trained in problem solving and the utilization of logic and action to shape future events.

Finally, confidence, which is arguably the basis of security and morale. Confidence can be inculcated by graduated training and exposure to challenge in such a way that the experience can be assimilated. Confidence in oneself and the team follows a belief in the organization and its goals, and its ability to achieve those objectives. Confidence must be tempered with a capacity for review and self-criticism and linked with a certain stoicism and persistence. Confidence and morale based on success will be hard to sustain in LIC when wins may be few and far between or not particularly obvious. In such a conflict it helps if the individual is prepared to persist just for the sake of obstinancy.

Personal Skill. Each individual must be highly proficient in the skills that he needs to employ on the battlefield. He must be a marksman with his primary weapon and highly competent with all of the other weapons and equipment in his team or unit. Marksmanship is vital. The option of utilizing a minimum or economy of force is often only viable if a target can be engaged with accuracy and precision under all conditions. If this is not an option then the individual, the unit, and the army as a whole, must rely

on the tactics of massing force. Technology will increasingly improve the precision of weapons and munitions, but it still requires the well trained individual to maximize the potential of his tools. As the proliferation of technology flows through the world, the only advantage that a soldier may have in LIC and war is superior training in these skills. On the conventional battlefield of tomorrow soldiers may have to fight out-numbered and account for the enemy by superior marksmanship. As in the development of unit expertise, individual training must move beyond artificial standards and create conditions akin to war in which personal skills, such as marksmanship, are further honed. Realistic field firing exercises must include a variety of terrain and meteorological conditions in which the procedures of war, not peace, guarantee safety.

Teamship. It is an impossibility to build a force in which each individual will be a better soldier than every enemy. But it is possible to build teams which maximize the strength of each individual and compensate for individual weaknesses. Personnel must be imbued with a balance of self-reliance and team spirit. The junior leader and the small sub-unit must be developed as a team. Sub-units must remain together until they have achieved a high standard of competence. Sub-unit leaders should be the trainers of their sub-unit where ever possible rather than non-team instructors. The organization must give prestige and responsibility to the sub-unit leaders and non-commissioned

officers while maintaining a single-chain-of-command.

Teamship, backed by institutionalized and self-discipline, facilitate the type of cohesion required for the successful conduct of LIC and war. It reduces the need for complex and detailed rules and allows initiative at every level. Teamship is induced by the promotion of the worthy and also the retention of personnel at a level and task in which they are proficient. Every member of the team must command respect and be appreciated for his role so that the abrogation of this respect or role is not made lightly. Training of the individual must illustrate the strength of a unity of purpose.

Summary

The most important factor in a military problem is the objective, but the most important element of a solution is human. The principal resource of armed forces are men and women. Well-trained and motivated personnel will overcome material and environmental difficulties to achieve objectives. The preparation and training of personnel to win in war must be the highest priority of armed forces. It is more than a military task but one that must be supported by the society as a whole. In Western nations every individual has an obligation to support the defence of the country and national interests: the concept of citizen-soldier is especially relevant to a democracy.

CHAPTER NINE

THE CONCLUSION

PROBLEM

Low Intensity Conflict has proven to be a significant threat to Western nations and their interests. Part of the threat is that the West has not been particularly successful in this type of conflict, and part is that there are other significant threats that demand a share of its finite resources. To meet all of the threats in a satisfactory manner there is the distinct possibility of not only debilitating the material resources of the West but the society as a whole: including the political and ideological dimensions.

It is possible that the current balance of power in the international system can be redressed by states, sub-national groups or a combination of both, utilizing qualitative force in LIC rather than quantitative force in war. As the possibility of the latter remains, a balance must be maintained along the total length and breadth of the conflict spectrum.

The problem for a Western democratic nation is to maintain and employ an appropriate strategy, force and tactics for the conduct of Low Intensity Conflict while meeting the other requirements of national strategy and without denigrating the ability of the state to conduct a higher level of war.

SOLUTION

It is not possible to construct a risk free strategy for national security. The objective is to formulate a comprehensive policy that minimizes the risks. The first step is for the Western nations to define their objectives. Then, they must understand the nature of conflict and how LIC is integrated into the conflict spectrum. They must understand their vulnerability within the conflict spectrum, and finally, address LIC as a part of the wider security problem. A solution must be total in application and integrate the areas of philosophy, strategy, doctrine, and force structure with the operational art, tactics, and preparation of armed forces. The three previous chapters have dealt with a suggested approach to these areas.

LIC must not be appreciated as something less than "war". It is merely a different type of "war", and the preparation of armed forces must be for the higher levels of conflict rather than concentrated on LIC. A nation is best served by a highly competent force that can project maximum violence when required. The West must develop qualitative forces for employment across the conflict spectrum, and these should be supplemented by the citizen-soldier.

The military solution for the conduct of LIC, and conflict in general, must be complemented by actions in the other dimensions of state to manage conflict to as low a level as possible, and to remove the viability of violence in man's affairs.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER ONE: THE INTRODUCTION

1Sigmund Neumam and Mark Von Hagen, "Engles and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society", *Makers of Modern Strategy. from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp 279-280. In Engles' theory armies could be social organizations to effect socialism by universal military service and resultant democratization. However, Communist regimes may employ armies more frequently than the West in non-military duties, but they are unlikely to assign the role of winning war any less importance than other states. History has shown that communist armies manipulate society by violence rather than universal democratization. Engles' concept of the army changing the nature of society by other than force is relevent to the conduct of LIC in the Third World.

2Major Paul Meishhen, USMCR, "Taking on Low-Intensity Conflicts", *Marine Copds Gazette*, January 1987, p. 44.

3Fred C. Ikle' and Albert Wohlsletter, co-chairmen, *Discriminate Deterrence. Report of The Commission on Integrated Lone Term Strategy*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, January 1988), p. 64.

4Ibid, pp. 1-3.

5Kim C. Beazley, MP, *The Defence of Australia*, 1987, presented to Parliament by The Minister For Defence, March 1987, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987), p. 26.

6Three predictions of future conflict environments were examined: two covering the US perception of conflict within the world, and one pertaining to regional and world conflict as applicable to Australia.

7R. Lynn Rylander, "The Future of the Marines in Small Wars", originated as a paper presented by Mr Rylander at the Center for Naval Analyses 1986 Sea Power Forum on the Marine Corps, pp. 68-70.

CHAPTER TWO: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IN GENERAL

1Colonel Richard H. Taylor, US Army, 'What Are These Things Called "Operations Short of War"' , Military Review, Volume LXVIII, January 1988), pp. 5-6.

2Refer to Appendix A.

3Taylor, p. 5-6.

4Aid-to-the-Civil-Power is a term employed in British Commonwealth countries to refer to military aid to the civil government in internal matters short of war. The term is defined in Appendix A.

5Brian Michael Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983), pp. 13-15. B. M. Jenkins points out that the use of terrorism is not an acknowledged tactic of the West, but it has become institutionalized and exploited by a mixture of national and sub-national players in much the same way that piracy was used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

6Rod Paschall, "Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine: Who Needs It?", Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, (Vol XV, No 3, 1985), p. 36.

7Ibid., p. 35. Paschall describes the multi-level concept of insurgency from the Perspective of the Vietnam experience: " The end game for the Asian insurgent is to place his adversary in a position where he must not only face regular troops in stand up battles, but to face the guerrilla as well. If one were to define low-intensity conflict as a form of warfare where irregulars fight regular armed forces, then the Asian insurgent's first phase could be described as low-intensity conflict. If one defines mid-intensity conflict as a battle between regulars the last two phases of the Asian insurgent model would be mid-intensity conflict. But it is essential to note that the irregular is still on the battle field, still contributing. Thus, the last two stages are a combination of both low- and mid- intensity conflict. Not only does the counter-insurgent have to defend everywhere, he must fight two types of conflict."

8Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act October 23. 1983, completed on 20 December 1983, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 39.

9Jenkins, op cit, p. v.

10Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, The White House, January 1987), reprinted for instructional purposes by USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico, p. 7.

11US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition), (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1 April 1987)

12W. Klingaman, Policy and Strategy Foundations for Low Intensity Warfare, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1986), pp. 10-11.

13The principles of war are in Appendix A.

14For example, the manoeuvre of WARSAW forces opposite NATO forces is not LIC, although it may be a prelude to higher conflict; nor is an isolated border conflict between Papuan and Indonesian patrols make for LIC; nor does espionage within itself constitute LIC These activities take place within a state of peaceful competition.

15Ilke' and Wohlsletter, pp. 6-7.

16See definition of LIC at Appendix A.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

1Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut, p. 1.

2Ibid., p. 33.

3Ibid., p. 122.

4Ibid., p 35.

5Ibid., p. 3.

6US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Publication 1, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1 June 1987), p. 370.

7See Appendix A.

8R. Kupperman, Low Intensity Conflict, Volume 1, (Virginia: Defence Technical Information Center, 1983), pp. 13-15.

9US Army Command and General Staff College, Field Circular 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 16 July 1986, pp 3-5 to 3-6.

10Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 15.

11Rylander, p. 64.

12Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 63.

13Reagan, p. 6.

14Beazely, p. 20.

15Reagan, pp 32-34. The security policy of the United States is oriented to Providing selected countries, beset with internal conflict, indirect aid rather than direct military intervention by US Military Forces.

16Chief of the Australian General Staff, Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare, Low Intensity Operations. Counter-Insurgency Operations, MLW 1-3-1, (Australian Army Department of Defence, Army Office, 4 June 1980), pp. F-12 to F-16.

17Ibid., P. F-26.

18Ibid., p. F-26,

19US Army FC 100-20, Chapter 5.

20US JCS Pub 1, pp. 214-215.

21Reagan, p. 4.

22See Chapter 5 for an explanation.

23Beazely, p. 24.

24Oliver B. Revell, " Motives and Tactics of Terrorist Groups", reprinted from Proceedings of the 9th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioural Science in Physical Security: Symmetry and Asymmetry of Global Adversary Behaviour, 3-4 April 1984, Springfield, Virginia, sponsored by: Defence Nuclear Agency, Nuclear Security Division. Oliver Revell lists several domestic terrorist groups responsible for violent activities within the USA. These groups, such as the United Freedom Front and the Klu Klux Klan, employ illegal means in their efforts to effect social and political change.

25Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Casey, USMC (Ret), "Soviet Third World Strategy", USMC Gazette, January 1987.

26Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 19, and Reagan. Both these references emphasise the need for long term security aid and less bureaucratic and business-like attitudes in the administration of this aid.

27The foreign policies of both USA and Australia, for example, emphasise the goals of global security as a Western objective.

28Kupperman, p. 10.

29Jenkins, p.3.

30Kupperman, This study emphasises throughout that LIC requires specialization.

31Jenkins, PP. 16-17.

32Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 8.

33Reagan, p 4.

34Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 6.

35Ibid., pp. 9-10.

36Kupperman, p. 15.

37Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 8.

38Beazely, p 3.

39Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 2.

40Ibid., p 33.

41Kupperman, p. 25.

42Ilke' and Wohlsletter, p. 25.

CHAPTER FOUR: An OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TYPES OF LIC

1Bard E. O'Neill, "The Analysis of Insurgency", The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, (Washington: National Defence University, 1984), p. 799.

2MLW 1-3-1, P. 1.

3The causes were extracted, redefined and expanded on the basis of current doctrine contained in MLW-1-3-1, and FC 100-20.

4US Army Command and General Staff College, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. P552, a teaching publication prepared by the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Committee, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), January 1988, pp. 55-60 gives a summary of the theory of "perceived relative deprivation".

5These factors were derived MLW 1-3-1, pp. 1-3 to 1-4, and O'Neill, pp. 803-815.

6O'Neill, p. 803.

7Ibid., pp. 801-802.

8Ibid., pp. 800-801.

9Synthesised from O'Neill, pp. 821-827, and FC 100-20, pp. 2-3 to 2-6.

10General Paul F. Gorman, " US Southern Command; Sentinel of Interests in Latin America", Low Intensity Conflict prepared for instructional purposes by LTCOL R. M. McCormick, (Quantico: Marine Corps Command and Staff College), 1988.

11Pascall, p. 35.

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13O'Neill, p. 825.

14The LIC doctrine of the Australia Army, the British Army, the United States Army, the United States Marine Corps, and the Counter Revolutionary Operations, Pam OTC 150, of the Royal Marines, were compared.

15Mr Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, p. 40.

16The USA law of posse commitatus severely curtails the employment of federal forces in state affairs.

17Expanded from principles in MLW 1-3-1, pp. 1-6 to 1-7, and extracted from FC 100-20, Chapter 3.

18Ibid.,

19MLW 1-3-1, p. F-28.

20FC 100-20, p 5-1.

21Rylander, p. 68.

22MLW 1-3-1, Chapter 6.

23Pascall, p. 36.

CHAPTER FIVE: AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER LIC

1Australian doctrine defines Aid-to-the-Civil-Power, as "...that Defence Force aid given to the civil authorities in the enforcement or maintenance of law and order."

2In order to deny an insurgency legitimacy through publicity it may be prudent to invoke Aid-to-the-Civil-Power legislation rather than a defence emergency.

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8FC 100-20, pp. 6-2 to 6.3

9See definition in Appendix A.

10Robert Houghton and Grank Trinka, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East, US government Printing Office, Department of State Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, November 1984, p. 3.

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CHAPTER SIX: GUIDING STRATEGY AND TACTICS

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2Ilke'and Wohlsletter.

3Jenkins, p. 16.

4USMC Small Wars Manual, Chapters 8 and 9.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: FORCE STRUCTURE

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APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

AID-TO-THE-CIVIL-POWER

AS-Defence Force-aid given to the civil authorities in the enforcement or maintenance of law and order.

ANTI TERRORISM

US--Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism.

CIVIL WAR

US--An internal conflict which meets the following criteria:

1. The insurgents occupy and control territory.
2. The insurgents have a functioning government.
3. Other states offer some type of recognition to the conflict and the insurgent state.
4. The insurgents have an organized army commanded by a person responsible for its actions, carries arms openly wear a distinctive uniform, and conduct hostilities in accordance with the rules of war.
5. A state of general hostilities accompanied by a military confrontation of a major proportion is taking place.

COUNTERTERRORISM

US--Offensive measures-taken to prevent, alter, and respond to terrorism.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENCE

US--Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any form of action programs by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

GENERAL WAR

US- -Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

US, NATO--Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantlt indigenous forces.

INSURGENCY

US- -An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

LIMITED WAR

US--Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

US--A limited politico- military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographical area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.

NUCLEAR WARFARE

US, NATO--Warfare involving the employment of nuclear weapons.

PARAMILITARY FORCES

US--As below.

US-- Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

US,UK--Selection and maintenance of aim, Offensive action, Concentration of force, Economy of effort, Flexibility, Cooperation, Security, Surprise, Maintenance of morale, and Administration.

US--Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of force, Movement, Cooperation, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (SAF)

US--A specially trained, area oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the commander of a unified command for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in limited war. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theatre requirements.

SECURITY FORCES

UK--Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.

SUBVERSION

US--Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political or morale of a nation, of a nation by

NATO--Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens.

TERRORISM

AS--The use, or threatened use, of violence for political ends, and any use, or threatened use ,of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.


US-The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

US-Those actions taken to counter the terrorist threat including antiterrorism.

WAR

Oxford Dictionary-Quarrel between nations conducted by force, state of open hostility, and suspension of ordinary international law, prevalent during such quarrel, military or naval attack or series of attacks.



(FIGURE 2)

The diagram illustrates the flow of military resources and personnel from a state of peace to total war. It is structured as a series of interconnected boxes and layers, with arrows indicating the direction of flow.

- Top Layer (Peace to War Transition):**
 - PEACE** (Left side)
 - TOTAL WAR** (Right side)
 - TRAINING** (Top left box, with an arrow pointing to it from **SPECIAL SKILLS, MEDICAL, LANGUAGES, CA**)
 - INDIRECT PARTICIPANTS (WAR INDUSTRY ETC.)** (Top right box)
 - HOME GUARD** (Bottom left box)
 - PEOPLE** (Right side label)
 - LIC MID** (Top right diagonal label)
- Mobilization and Reserve Layers:**
 - MOBILIZATION** (Middle box)
 - WAR RESERVE** (Bottom middle box)
 - RESERVE** (Bottom right box)
 - RESERVE** (Left side label, with an arrow pointing to the Reserve box)
- Force Deployment Layers:**
 - CONTINGENCY FORCE TO ANY REGION** (Left side label, with an arrow pointing to the Reserve box)
 - MECH/ACFT** (Bottom left box, with a diagonal hatching pattern)
 - MECH ARTY MODULE ACFT** (Bottom middle box, with a dotted pattern)
 - INF** (Bottom right box)
 - FOLLOW ON FORCES** (Right side label, with an arrow pointing to the INF box)
- Prepositioned and Deployment Layers:**
 - SAF** (Left side label, with an arrow pointing to the SAF box)
 - MECH/ACFT HVY AIR MOBILE PREPOSITIONED** (Bottom left box, with a diagonal hatching pattern)
 - MECH ARTY MODULE ACFT** (Bottom middle box, with a dotted pattern)
 - INF HVY AIRMOBILE/BORNE, MARINE PREPOSITIONED** (Bottom right box)
 - SAF/SO** (Right side label, with an arrow pointing to the SAF/SO box)
 - RAPID DEPLOYMENT** (Right side label, with an arrow pointing to the INF HVY AIRMOBILE/BORNE, MARINE PREPOSITIONED box)
- Input and Output:**
 - INPUT AND RESOURCES FROM STATE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS** (Right side label, with an arrow pointing to the Mobilization and Reserve layers)
 - H/MIC** (Bottom left output label, with an arrow pointing away from the diagram)
 - LIC** (Bottom right output label, with an arrow pointing away from the diagram)

SAF/SO
COMMAND
RESPONSIBLE FOR SAF DOCTRINE
TRG AND CMD OF SAF
ONLY OPS
PROVIDE SAF FORCES IN
SPT OF REGIONAL AND CONTINGENCY
FORCES
COMAND LIC/SAF OPS AS COMD.

(FIGURE 3)